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The question of whether Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 
adopted a more lenient or more stringent standard for testing the reliability of 
expert evidence has dogged academics, practitioners, and researchers for 
twenty years.2  Research since 1993, using a variety of methodologies, has 
been largely inconsistent.  Some quantitative studies show that the Daubert 
standard has had no effect on the admission of expert evidence.3  Other 
quantitative studies find the opposite, that Daubert is a more stringent standard 
of admissibility.4  Daubert cannot be both meaningless and more restrictive, 
and determining which of these two conclusions is correct will have enormous 
implications. 
If the shift to Daubert had no effect on the judicial management of evidence 
or trial outcomes, the choice between the Daubert standard and the traditional 
Frye test for admissibility5 is without consequence.6  Perhaps, if this is true, 
reformers should abandon efforts to change the tort system through doctrinal 
modifications and seek redress elsewhere.7  Moreover, an impotent Daubert 
                                                            
 1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in 
Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 75–76 (1998) (indicating that the issue of whether 
Daubert imposes a stricter standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence is a recurring topic 
of debate); see also Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of 
Judges on Judging Experience in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 443 
(2001) (concluding that judges are split in their views on the effect Daubert has had in their 
analyses of whether to admit expert evidence). 
 3. See, e.g., DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: 
EXPERT EVIDENCE § 6.3.2, at 204 (2004) (concluding that, based on the available research, 
“Daubert is neither uniformly stricter nor invariably weaker that Frye”); Jennifer L. Groscup et 
al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal 
Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 363 (2002) (finding that an analysis of appellate 
decisions demonstrated “no change in the overall rate of admission for all types of expert 
evidence”). 
 4. See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING 
EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION xv (2001) (“Our 
analysis of district court opinions suggests that after Daubert, judges scrutinized reliability more 
carefully and applied stricter standards in deciding whether to admit expert evidence.”); see also 
Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert 
Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 322 (2002) (noting that 
judges “reported that they were more likely to scrutinize expert testimony before trial and were 
less likely to admit it” following Daubert). 
 5. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that scientific 
evidence must have gained sufficient “standing and scientific recognition among” authorities in 
the field). 
 6. See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of 
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 503 (2005) (stating that “a state’s 
adoption of Frye or Daubert makes no difference in practice”). 
 7. See id. at 505 (arguing that procedural limits on tort litigation often lead to tort reform 
movements that have no effect on the outcomes of subsequent cases). 
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would also indicate that the controversy in evidence law about expert 
admissibility has been much ado about nothing. 
However, if Daubert is a more stringent standard, the implications are 
enormous.  It would indicate that—at the time of its decision—the Supreme 
Court badly misjudged what effect Daubert would have on the admissibility of 
scientific evidence.  At the time, the Court believed that the decision would be 
consistent with “the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules [of Evidence] and their 
general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony.”8  If 
this were not true, the Court would need to revisit expert reliability standards, 
to clarify the standard by either affirming the new reality or insisting upon the 
lenient standard initially envisioned.  A stricter Daubert standard would also 
have an enormous effect on substantive tort law by procedural modification.9  
Finally, a stricter standard for admissibility affects the market for expert 
witness services, because only those experts who can provide a sound 
empirical basis for their opinions will be permitted to testify.10  Therefore, the 
interpretation of the Daubert standard is important, especially in an era when 
expert witness testimony is as prevalent as it is today.11 
In this Article, we answer the question: Did Daubert have a measurable 
effect on expert admissibility, and if so, did it adopt a stricter or more lenient 
standard for admissibility?  To make this determination, this Article builds on a 
                                                            
 8. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).  Four years 
after Daubert, the Court reiterated its understanding that Daubert lowered the admissibility 
standard.  See Gen. Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (acknowledging that “the Federal 
Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony 
than would have been admissible under Frye”); see also infra notes 46–52 and accompanying text 
(detailing the Court’s perception of the role of the Daubert decision). 
 9. See infra Part III.A (discussing in detail the implications of a stricter Daubert standard). 
 10. Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert 
Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 239 (2000) (“Testimony from those fields that could, but do 
not, provide adequate data . . . should be excluded until they can provide adequate empirical 
support for what the experts are claiming for their field in general, or for themselves 
individually.”). 
 11. The percentage of cases involving experts remains an area with surprisingly few 
definitive statistics.  One oft-cited study concluded that experts are involved in as many as 86% of 
all civil jury cases.  Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WISC. L. REV. 1113, 1119  
(reporting data from all civil jury cases tried in California Superior Court between 1985 and 
1986).  Other studies returned an expert witness rate between 63% and 71%.  Anthony 
Champagne et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in American Courts, 
31 JURIMETRICS J. 375, 380 (1991) (finding that 57 out of 90 civil cases tried in the Dallas 
County District Court in Texas in 1988 utilized expert witness testimony); Daniel Shuman et al., 
An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts—Part II: A Three City 
Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 197 (1994) (reporting that 131 cases out of 183 included expert 
testimony, a rate of 73%).  Regardless of the exact rate, experts are a permanent and enormous 
part of modern litigation. 
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methodology used in a 2005 study by Edward Cheng  and Albert Yoon.12  In 
certain cases, removal allows a civil defendant the option of transferring a case 
from state to federal court.13  By removing the case, however, the defendant 
may also be changing the scientific admissibility standard from the state 
court’s Frye standard to the federal Daubert standard.14  Cheng and Yoon first 
suggested that the effect of Daubert could be measured across the judicial 
system by reviewing removal rates from state to federal court in multiple 
jurisdictions.15  We also believe that removal rates offer a very accurate 
method of measuring the systematic effect of Daubert because these rates test 
litigants’ opinions in the context of real cases.16 
To this end, we created a database of approximately 4 million cases and 
calculated removal rates during the period from 1990 to 2000.  Based on our 
two-step analysis of that data, we conclude that Daubert is a stricter standard 
than Frye for the admissibility of expert testimony.17  First, by properly 
identifying, isolating, and removing other possible confounding variables, we 
were able to isolate and then measure the effect of the federal courts’ adoption 
                                                            
 12. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 482–84 (describing the removal-rate metric). 
 13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2006) (articulating the requirements to remove a case from state 
court to federal court); see also Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 482–83 (explaining that a litigant 
may remove a tort action—normally restricted to state court—to federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction). 
 14. The central premise allowing for this comparison is that evidence rules are generally 
considered to be procedural, and thus a state’s evidentiary rules on expert admissibility will not 
transfer upon removal.  Instead, the Federal Rules of Evidence will usually apply to the action, 
even if state substantive tort law remains.  See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 483 (explaining 
that, although state substantive law is retained in tort cases because of diversity jurisdiction and 
the Erie doctrine, the procedural rules of the new forum are applied (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938))); see also, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, When Daubert Gets Erie: 
Medical Certainty and Medical Expert Testimony in Federal Court, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 69, 82 
(1999) (asserting that “[m]ost federal courts apply the Federal Rules of Evidence rather than state 
rules to all evidentiary questions in diversity cases”); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory 
Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1979 & n.279 
(2011) (explaining that the Federal Rules of Evidence are generally considered to be procedural 
and are applied in cases removed from state courts); Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 65, 98–99 (2008) (noting that all evidence rules, except burdens of proof, 
privileges, presumptions, and the competency of witnesses, are procedural). 
 15. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 482 (using the rate at which cases were removed to 
federal court to measure the effect of the Daubert decision on the admission of expert evidence). 
 16. See infra Part II.B (explaining the merits of using removal rate as a measuring tool). 
 17. See infra Part II.C.2 (demonstrating that the rate of removal to federal court in Frye 
states increased following the adoption of Daubert in federal courts); see also infra Part II.C.3 
(demonstrating that the rate of removal to federal court decreased once Frye states adopted 
Daubert); infra Part II.C.4 (concluding that the rates of removal to federal court in relation to a 
jurisdiction’s adoption of Daubert indicate that Daubert is a stricter standard for admissibility 
than Frye). 
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of Daubert on removal rates to federal court.18  These results demonstrate that, 
absent other countervailing effects, the adoption of Daubert by federal courts 
results in an increase in civil defendants removing the case to federal courts to 
benefit from the courts’ restriction of expert testimony under that standard.19  
Second, by using the same process, we were able to measure the counter-effect 
on removals when a state court adopted Daubert after the federal courts had 
already done so.20  These results demonstrate that a state court’s adoption of 
Daubert after federal adoption decreases the rate of removals to federal court.21  
This is consistent with our initial result because, after the state court adopts 
Daubert, litigants gain no procedural benefit from shifting court systems when 
both apply the same reliability standard.  Combined, these results demonstrate 
unequivocally that, when measured in the aggregate and based on actual 
behavior in real cases, civil defendants believe the Daubert standard is more 
restrictive to expert testimony and act accordingly.22 
We begin in Part I of this Article by briefly outlining the Daubert standard 
and the impact the case has had on gatekeeping expert testimony.  
Additionally, Part I introduces prior empirical studies on Daubert, and 
addresses those studies’ contradictory results.  We then begin our empirical 
analysis in Part II.  First, we briefly review the Cheng and Yoon study and its 
counterintuitive finding that a state’s choice between Daubert and Frye 
“makes no difference in practice.”23  We then explain in more detail why the 
removal rate metric is the key to determining Daubert’s true effect.  Next, we 
then used the removal rate metric to analyze our database of civil case data in 
order to measure the aggregate effect of Daubert on litigant behavior.  Our 
analysis demonstrates that the adoption of Daubert in federal court did, in a 
statistically significant manner, increase removal rates from Frye states.  
Furthermore, we will also demonstrate that in the period after the federal 
adoption of Daubert, a state’s adoption of a Daubert-type standard for state 
court reduced the removal rates, thereby reversing the post-Daubert increase in 
removals.  Both findings demonstrate, for the first time and using actual case 
data, that civil defendants believe Daubert is a stricter admissibility standard. 
                                                            
 18. See infra Part II.C.2 (explaining the methodology by which we analyzed the impact of 
Daubert on removal rates in Frye states). 
 19. See infra Part II.C.2 (noting our conclusion that the rate of removal to federal court in 
Frye states increased after the adoption of Daubert in federal courts). 
 20. See infra Part II.C.3 (explaining the methodology by which we analyzed the subsequent 
adoption of Daubert in state courts on removal rates). 
 21. See infra Part II.C.4 (noting our conclusion that the rate of removal to federal court 
following a state’s adoption of Daubert reverted to pre-federal-court-adoption levels). 
 22. See infra Part II.C.4 (summarizing our conclusion that Daubert is a stricter standard 
because of the preceding analysis of litigant behavior in relation to a jurisdiction’s adoption of 
that standard). 
 23. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 503. 
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Because our results so clearly contrast with Cheng and Yoon, who used the 
same data, we then revisit the Cheng and Yoon study and evaluate its 
methodology in detail.  In so doing, we found that Cheng and Yoon appear to 
have made three kinds of errors in their analysis that explain why they failed to 
identify the true nature of adoption of Daubert.  First, there seem to be errors 
in how they determined the removal rates that form their study population.  
Second, they failed to recognize that state adoption of Daubert after federal 
adoption of Daubert will have a different effect than state adoption of Daubert 
before federal adoption of Daubert.  Consequently, their data is internally 
inconsistent with regard to their analysis of state adoption of Daubert.  Third, 
the small size of the study population they directly use (removal rates) 
combined with the enormous size of the population they derive the study 
population from (torts filed in state court) minimized the chances of finding an 
effect from state adoption of Daubert. 
Finally, we will finish in Part III with some comments on the significance of 
a stricter Daubert standard.  We also suggest areas for future empirical 
consideration that would build upon our research. 
By measuring the actual behavior of civil litigants, this Study can answer the 
question whether Daubert is a stricter standard for expert admissibility.  Based 
on our analysis of the behavior of civil defendants in actual cases, the answer is 
yes. 
I.  GATEKEEPING EXPERT EVIDENCE, DAUBERT, AND CURRENT RESEARCH ON 
DAUBERT’S EFFECT 
As many as 86% of all cases involve expert evidence and, consequently, this 
evidence is of central importance to modern civil and criminal litigation.24  
With certain civil causes of action—such as products liability or medical 
malpractice—the percentage of cases utilizing expert evidence can be even 
higher.25  In this context, any changes in the rules governing expert evidence 
have the potential to greatly affect case management.26  Before analyzing the 
data on Daubert’s effect, we will first review the issue of admissibility 
                                                            
 24. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of expert evidence 
in modern litigation). 
 25. See Gross, supra note 11, at 1119 (finding that over 90% of products liability and 
medical malpractice cases relied on expert testimony); see also Joseph Sanders, From Science to 
Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Benedectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 31–32 
(1993) (noting the particular importance of expert witnesses in products liability cases). 
 26. See Krafka et al., supra note 4, at 328 (reporting that approximately 69% of judges 
surveyed changed their procedures for considering the admissibility of expert evidence following 
their jurisdictions’ shift to Daubert and that, generally, judges view themselves as more active in 
the admissibility process following Daubert); see also The Changing Role of Judges in the 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, CIV. ACTION (Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts), Spring 2006, at 3 
[hereinafter Changing Role of Judges]. 
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standards for scientific evidence, and review prior interesting but inconclusive 
studies on their effect. 
A.  The Frye Decision and Expert Admissibility 
Concern over the admissibility of expert witness testimony did not originate 
with the Daubert debate of the late twentieth century.  In fact, the admissibility 
standard articulated in Frye v. United States grew out of dissatisfaction with 
preexisting common law standards.  Eventually the Frye standard became the 
admissibility test in federal and many state courts, when litigants raised the 
issue of admissibility of scientific testimony.  Frye required that—before 
admission—a method be generally accepted in the relevant field.27  However, 
throughout the twentieth century, critics exposed many weaknesses of the Frye 
general acceptance formula.28 
Before 1923, judges used two common law tests to determine the 
admissibility of expert evidence.  Some courts simply evaluated the 
helpfulness of the evidence to a lay jury, and admitted the evidence if it was 
relevant.29  Others would consider the qualifications of the expert under what 
Professor David Faigman and his coauthors call “the commercial marketplace 
test,” whereby any expert who succeeds in a chosen profession must do so 
based on expertise.30 
By 1923, the problems with relying on relevance or the reputation of the 
expert led the D.C. Circuit to reconsider the standard for admissibility of 
expert evidence.31  In Frye, the court shifted the focus away from the prior 
                                                            
 27. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 28. See infra notes 36–41 and accompanying text (tracking the evolution of the Frye 
standard and its shortcomings). 
 29. KAYE ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.2.1, at 6–7 (noting that expert testimony must have been 
“particularly important to aiding the trier of fact” in order to be admitted); David L. Faigman et 
al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding 
the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 
1803 (1994) (explaining that the relevant inquiry was whether the testimony was from an area 
beyond the knowledge of the average juror). 
 30. Faigman et al., supra note 29, at 1804 & n.13 (noting that judges would evaluate the 
qualifications and expertise of the expert through “the expert’s success in an occupation or 
profession which embraced” the subject matter in question); Michael J. Saks, Judging 
Admissibility, 35 J. CORP. L. 135, 136 (2009) (explaining that judges often inferred expertise from 
the expert’s commercial success). 
 31. Frye, 293 F. at 1013; see also Faigman et al., supra note 29, at 1805 (arguing that Frye 
was a response to the failure of the commercial marketplace test); Saks, supra note 30, at 137 
(noting that “commercial value is not a measure of scientific or any other kind of validity”); 
Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters with 
Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1074 (1998) (explaining that the flaws 
of the commercial marketplace test necessitated the Frye standard). 
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common law standard to a “general acceptance test.”32  The court concluded 
that expert testimony cannot be considered at trial unless it has become 
“sufficiently established as to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field to which it belongs.”33  Applying this standard, the Frye court affirmed 
the exclusion of the expert testimony because the testing in question remained 
experimental.34 
With the holding in Frye, the D.C. Circuit developed a standard by which a 
court could assess whether a scientific principle had gained sufficient 
recognition as to be appropriate to consider in court.  Yet, for all its 
controversy, particularly later, the standard appears to have been applied 
sparingly for decades.  Professor Michael Saks notes that the case was not 
cited for over 10 years following the decision; it received fewer than 15 
citations in its first 25 years, and fewer than 100 citations in the next 25-year 
span.35  By the late twentieth century, however, the trend shifted. 
The Frye test was used primarily in criminal cases until the late 1980s36 
when courts began to apply it to complex scientific causation in toxic tort 
cases.37  The application of the Frye test to complicated civil cases intensified 
the existing controversy over the standard, and commentators noted the 
unworkability of the vague “general acceptance” test.38  Critics argued that the 
                                                            
 32. Frye, 293 F. at 1013–14 (considering the admissibility of expert testimony explaining 
the systolic blood pressure deception test); see also Faigman et al., supra note 29, at 1806 
(arguing that, although Frye is inherently a marketplace test, the standard shifts the emphasis 
from the credentials of the expert and the commercial marketplace, requiring an evaluation of the 
body of knowledge rather than the expert himself). 
 33. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 34. Id. (holding that “the systolic blood pressure deception test ha[d] not yet gained such 
standing and scientific recognition” to justify admitting the expert testimony). 
 35. Saks, supra note 30, at 139; see also Faigman et al., supra note 29, at 1808 (describing 
Frye as “barely noticed” and “of little importance” in the decades after it was decided).  Professor 
David Bernstein noted that, despite the dearth of federal court citations to Frye, state courts may 
have used the standard more often in deciding cases.  David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The 
Past, Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 388–90 
(2001).  However, that theory cannot be tested because state trial court opinions generally remain 
unpublished.  Id. 
 36. Bernstein, supra note 35, at 390 (asserting that Frye was applied only in criminal cases 
until 1988); Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1637, 1693–95 (1993) (indicating that 64 of  67 federal appellate decisions applying Frye 
were criminal decisions); Susan Haack, An Epistemologist in the Bramble-Bush: At the Supreme 
Court with Mr. Joiner, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 217, 227 (2001) (noting that Frye was the 
standard for the admissibility of expert evidence first in criminal cases, but later became the 
standard in civil cases); cf. KAYE ET AL., supra note 3, § 5.3.2, at  
159–60 (detailing the several types of evidence the Frye test has been used to exclude). 
 37. Bernstein, supra note 35, at 390–92 (explaining that Frye was applied to toxic tort cases 
starting in 1988). 
 38. See, e.g., Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 
595, 628 (1988) (arguing that the Frye test is too incoherent to be applied effectively by the 
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test provided little guidance on what evidence demonstrated general 
acceptance, and then what level of proof was required.39  They also noted 
Frye’s failure to exclude “scientific” evidence that later proved to be 
unfounded.40  In his exhaustive study of toxic tort litigation, Professor Joseph 
Sanders analyzed the judicial decision making process in case law and 
examined in detail how the system failed to properly manage complex expert 
testimony.41 
Criticism of the Frye standard left many with an impression of judicial 
incompetence in the management of scientific evidence,42 and commentators 
showed increasing dismay with courts’ inability to sift away “junk science.”43  
In the context of this debate over the courts’ ability to properly manage 
complex science, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in a toxic tort case 
from the Ninth Circuit: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.44 
                                                                                                                                         
courts); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, 
A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1207–08, 1223 (1980) (arguing that the Frye test 
is too vague and leads to inconsistent results). 
 39. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 3, § 5.3.3, at 164 (noting that the Frye decision was 
unclear in its standard); Giannelli, supra note 41, at 1219 (finding that courts are unsure as to the 
appropriate scenarios to which to apply the Frye standard). 
 40. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE (1991); see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 
3, § 5.3.2, at 163–64 (providing examples of cases  in which the Frye standard allowed for the 
admission of “worthless and potentially misleading” scientific evidence); Giannelli, supra note 
38, at 1224–25 (pointing to the admission of evidence collected from paraffin tests as proof of 
Frye’s shortcomings). 
 41. Sanders, supra note 25, at 27–28 (arguing that scientific data “fails to provide the lay 
fact finder with the resources necessary to assess properly the quality of experts or the weight and 
relative importance of the scientific findings”). 
 42. See Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence—An Alternative to the 
Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 551–52 (1984) (asserting that judges often admitted 
evidence under Frye because of their failure to understand the relevant scientific principles). 
 43. See, e.g., CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS 46–47 (2006) (arguing that expert testimony 
can be used to mislead judges and juries unfamiliar with the scientific evidence); MICHAEL D. 
GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
LITIGATION 20 (1996) (articulating concern about the use of invalid scientific evidence); HUBER, 
supra note 40, at 14–17; David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the 
Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 123 (1996) (alleging misuse of scientific evidence in 
toxic tort cases); Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science”, 1998 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 3, ¶¶ 52, 57 (noting tensions regarding the use of junk science); Barry M. Epstein & Marc S. 
Klein, The Use and Abuse of Expert Testimony in Product Liability Actions, 17 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 656, 660–62 (1987) (acknowledging the concern over the use of bad science in product 
liability cases). 
 44. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 506 
U.S. 214 (1992). 
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B.  The Daubert Revolution and Its Aftermath 
The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective in 1975,45 and while the 
rules contained a specific section on expert admission, the effect of Rule 702 
on the Frye standard was unclear.46  The Daubert Court definitively resolved 
the dispute. 
In Daubert, Justice Harold Blackmun—writing for the majority—stated 
unequivocally “[t]hat [the] austere [Frye] standard, absent from, and 
incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in 
federal trials.”47  Beyond that initial labeling of Frye as austere, there are 
additional reasons to believe that the Daubert Court consciously lowered the 
standard for admissibility.  Instead of Frye’s “general acceptance” test, the 
Daubert test depends on the twin standards of Rule 702: relevance and 
reliability.48  The Court specifically stated that a Rule 702 approach is 
consistent with the Federal Rules’ purpose “of relaxing the traditional barriers 
to opinion testimony.”49  In addition, under the new standard, the Court 
specifically endorsed the idea that shaky expert evidence should be admitted, 
subject to vigorous cross-examination.50  Four years later in General Electric 
Co. v. Joiner, the Court expressly stated what had been implied in Daubert: 
“the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a somewhat 
broader range of scientific testimony than would have been admissible under 
Frye.”51  The intent of the Daubert standard, the Court later explained, was to 
ensure that any expert “employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual 
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”52 
                                                            
 45. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (enacting the Federal Rules of 
Evidence). 
 46. See Giannelli, supra note 38, at 1228–29 (“The adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence has not resolved the uncertain status of the Frye test.  Indeed, the Federal Rules, which 
became effective in 1975 and have been adopted in various forms by twenty-two jurisdictions, 
have contributed to the confusion.” (citation omitted)); see also Faigman et al., supra note 29, at 
1809–10 (noting that, even though Rule 702 and the Advisory Committee Notes made no 
reference to Frye, courts incorporated the “general acceptance” standard into the Rule 702 test). 
 47. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582, 589 (1993). 
 48. See id. at 589 (explaining that Rule 702 is “[t]he primary locus” of the trial judge’s duty 
to ensure that expert evidence is both relevant and reliable); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring 
expert evidence to be both helpful to the trier of fact and reliable in both its methodology and the 
expert’s execution of that methodology). 
 49. Id. at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 
U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). 
 50. Id. at 596 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)) (explaining that 
inconsistencies or inaccuracies in expert testimony can be challenged by cross-examination). 
 51. Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997). 
 52. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). 
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After Daubert, federal courts began to apply the Rule 702 standard to many 
different forms of scientific evidence.53  Daubert empowered judges to act as 
gatekeepers of expert evidence, a role that requires detailed assessment of 
complex scientific principles.54  Even though the Daubert majority expressed 
confidence in the judiciary’s ability to handle this gatekeeping role, Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist expressed apprehension in converting judges into 
“amateur scientists.”55  Certainly many commentators, scholars, and even 
federal judges shared his concern.56 
After 20 years, Daubert’s influence in state courts remains mixed.  Many 
states decided, even after Daubert, that their courts would continue to use the 
Frye test to evaluate expert evidence.57  Other states concluded that Daubert 
recognized the judicial role already present in their jurisdictions.58  Finally, a 
large group of states followed the lead of the Supreme Court and abandoned 
Frye in favor of Daubert’s rules-based reliability approach.59  In these states, 
the Daubert decision directed judges to become more involved in gatekeeping 
decisions and screening scientific evidence for methodological soundness.60  
Indeed, even in those states that retained Frye, the debate over the 
                                                            
 53. See generally Saks, supra note 30, at 147–55 (discussing the application of the Daubert 
standard to several types of forensic evidence). 
 54. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94, 597 (requiring the trial judge to assess the scientific 
validity of proffered expert evidence and urging judges to engage in the evaluation of such factors 
as the peer reception and margin of error of the scientific technique or methodology in question); 
see also Gatowski et al., supra note 2, at 436–37 (discussing the factors Daubert provided to 
judges for assessing scientific validity, but also noting that the Court did not provide specific 
guidance for evaluating these principles). 
 55. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600–01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Justice Blackmun and the majority did not share this concern.  Id. at 592–93 (majority opinion) 
(“We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Saks, supra note 30, at 144 (recognizing that some judges are unwilling or 
unable to apply Daubert in cases with complex scientific evidence); see also Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that federal judges “face a far more 
complex and daunting task in a post-Daubert world than before”). 
 57. KAYE ET AL., supra note 3, § 6.4.2, at 225–26 & n.17.  This group of states includes: 
Pennsylvania, see Grady v. Frito-Lay, 839 A.2d 1038, 1039 (Pa. 2003) (retaining Frye); Illinois, 
see Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 323 (Ill. 2002) (same); California, see 
People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 324 (Cal. 1994) (same); New York, see People v. Wesley, 633 
N.E.2d 451, 454 (N.Y. 1994) (same); and Florida, see Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 
(Fla. 1993) (same).  For a complete list of those states that retained the Frye standard after 
Daubert, see David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 
JURIMETRICS J. 351, 355 n.25 (2004). 
 58. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 3, § 6.4.2, at 225 & n.14 (listing the courts that applied a 
Daubert-like standard before the decision). 
 59. See id. at 225 & n.16 (listing the courts that followed the Supreme Court and adopted the 
Daubert standard). 
 60. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (describing the judge’s role as gatekeeper 
under Daubert and the type of analysis performed by a judge in assessing the scientific validity of 
expert evidence). 
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admissibility standard for experts appears to have increased judicial scrutiny of 
scientific evidence.61 
C.  Prior Studies on Daubert: Surveys and Case Review Analysis 
Even if judges in both Daubert and Frye jurisdictions have examined 
scientific evidence more closely after Daubert, many scholars question if the 
shift in standards had a major effect on the handling of cases.  To help answer 
this question, researchers have both surveyed judges and performed 
quantitative analysis of reported cases. 
1.  Studies Relying on Survey Methodology 
Survey instruments since Daubert have attempted to measure the effect of 
the Rule 702 standard on judicial practices.  For example, a 2001 study by 
Sophia Gatowski and her coauthors analyzed state court judges’ perceptions of 
the gatekeeping function and the effect of Daubert.62  Judges surveyed 
supported the gatekeeping role by a wide margin (91%), and over 60% of 
judges saw themselves taking an active role in admissibility analysis.63  When 
asked about the effect of Daubert on the gatekeeping process, the judges’ 
responses did not show a clear consensus.64  The largest group of judges in the 
survey (36%) believed Daubert was not intended to raise or lower the 
threshold for admissibility, and an additional 11% were unsure of Daubert’s 
intent.65  Even among those who believed Daubert did change the admissibility 
standard, the result was mixed.  Twenty-three percent of respondents stated 
that the Court’s intent was to lower the threshold, while 32% indicated that the 
court’s intent was to raise the standard.66  In that 2001 survey, then, judges 
lacked consensus on the effect of Daubert on gatekeeping, even if many 
supported an active judicial role. 
                                                            
 61. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 3, at 186 (noting that Frye jurisdictions apply the test with 
“enhanced vigor”); see also Bernstein, supra note 35, at 393 (asserting that Frye is “slowly 
converging with Daubert jurisprudence”). 
 62. Gatowski et al., supra note 2, at 433.  The participating judges were from both Daubert 
and Frye jurisdictions.  Id. at 442 (surveying 400 judges: 205 from Daubert jurisdictions and 195 
from Frye jurisdictions). 
 63. Id. at 443 (noting that judges support the gatekeeping function regardless of which 
admissibility standard is applied). 
 64. Id. at 444 (finding a 14% difference between judges who believed Daubert changed 
their roles as gatekeeper and those who believed that their roles remained the same following the 
Daubert decision). 
 65. Id. at 443 (stating that those who believed that Daubert had no intent to change the 
standard for admissibility instead believed that Daubert’s intent was to give judges the discretion 
to apply the admissibility framework themselves). 
 66. Id. 
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In 2002, Carol Krafka and her colleagues surveyed federal district court 
judges to determine their opinions on the effect of Daubert in the courts.67  
Krafka’s survey of over 300 respondents found that federal judges are more 
likely to closely scrutinize, limit, and exclude expert testimony after Daubert.68  
Eighteen percent of the reported exclusions were due to the unreliability of the 
evidence.69  Krafka and her colleagues concluded that their data demonstrated 
that, since Daubert, judges more actively analyzed expert evidence and were 
less likely to admit it.70  However, the survey only included cases that went to 
trial.71 
In 2006, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) published a 
preliminary study addressing the management of expert witnesses in Delaware 
state courts.72  In that study, NCSC researchers examined civil case filings and 
surveyed participants to assess the change in case management practices 
following the adoption of Daubert by Delaware courts in 1999.73  The study 
concluded that although the Daubert system in Delaware resulted in the 
judiciary seeking a more active gatekeeping role, ultimately “[t]he overall 
impact of Daubert has been minimal compared to the original fears when the 
U.S. Supreme Court issued its decisions on the admissibility of expert 
testimony.”74 Although judicial surveys published since Daubert uniformly 
support the proposition that judges now see themselves as more active in the 
management of complex scientific evidence, the studies are inconclusive on 
the critical question of the substantive effect of the Daubert standard.  While 
Krafka’s study suggests that judges perceive themselves as more stringent 
under Daubert, Gatowski’s respondents were significantly more equivocal. 
Survey research has provided important insight on the issue of Daubert, but it 
leaves the central question unanswered. 
                                                            
 67. Krafka et al., supra note 4, at 309 (noting that judges were asked about their most recent 
civil trial and their general experience with trials). 
 68. Id. at 322 (finding that judges assert more control over the admissibility of expert 
witness testimony post-Daubert). 
 69. Id. at 322–23 (explaining that, although exclusion of scientific evidence increased after 
Daubert, judges’ evaluation of the evidence largely depends on the reliability of the methodology 
of the expert rather than the other Daubert criteria, such as margin of error or that the method was 
subject to peer review). 
 70. Id. at 330 (concluding that the clarification of admissibility standards has motivated 
more careful consideration of proffered testimony). 
 71. Id. at 331 (“To determine how Daubert and its associated cases have affected judicial 
and attorney practices in the majority of cases that never go to trial, further research will be 
needed.”). 
 72. Changing Role of Judges, supra note 26, at 1–4. 
 73. Id. at 3 (examining civil case filings in Delaware Superior Court and interviewing 20 
attorneys and 13 judges). 
 74. Id. at 3–4 (finding that Daubert did not result in an “excessive or unnecessary cost or 
delay” in Delaware courts). 
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2.  Quantitative Analysis of Reported Cases 
Researchers studying the effect of Daubert have also used non-survey 
methodologies, by analyzing reported court decisions to measure changes since 
1993.  Just as with the survey research, these studies are also largely 
inconclusive. 
A 2001 study by Lloyd Dixon and Brian Gill examined the substantive 
effect of the Daubert decision in federal civil cases by analyzing challenges to 
expert evidence in federal district courts.75  Their methodology evaluated the 
number of reported decisions in Westlaw’s database that dealt with challenges 
to expert evidence and the results of reliability determinations in those 
decisions.76  Dixon and Gill concluded that the data “suggest that the standards 
for reliability tightened in the years after the Daubert decision.”77  However, 
the researchers noted that their study had two important limitations: (1) their 
findings did not address whether greater judicial scrutiny resulted in better 
outcomes in the affected cases; and (2) the study was not conclusive in 
determining whether Daubert’s effect was uniform across the judiciary.78  
Even with the limitations, Dixon and Gill concluded that their “analysis of 
district court opinions suggests that following Daubert, judges scrutinized 
reliability more carefully and applied stricter standards in deciding whether to 
admit expert evidence.”79 
In 2002, Jennifer Groscup and her colleagues published an empirical study 
on  the effect of Daubert on expert testimony in federal criminal cases.80  
Using a methodology similar to Dixon and Gill’s analysis, Groscup used 
search terms in a computer database to see what trends or changes could be 
measured over time.81  In evaluating trends in both state and federal courts, 
Groscup found that “the basic rates of admission at the trial and the appellate 
court levels did not change significantly after Daubert in criminal cases on 
appeal.”82  Groscup suggested that the party offering the evidence, the type of 
counsel for the defense, and the standard of review may all play a part in the 
static rates of admission of expert evidence.83  Groscup concluded that, 
although there may be increased scrutiny of scientific evidence in criminal 
                                                            
 75. DIXON & GILL, supra note 4, at xii–xiv. 
 76. Id. at 15–19 (explaining the methodology by which the data was collected). 
 77. Id. at 28 fig.4.1, 29 (reporting that the success rate for the challenge of expert evidence 
increased following Daubert). 
 78. Id. at 30–31 (noting that additional data is needed to address the study’s limitations). 
 79. Id. at 61. 
 80. Groscup et al., supra note 3, at 342 (examining appellate court decisions). 
 81. Id. at 342–44 (using specific terms and connectors and date restrictions in the Westlaw 
database). 
 82. Id. at 345 (noting that this conclusion was contrary to the prediction of most 
commentators). 
 83. Id. at 346–47. 
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cases, “no change in the overall rate of admission for all types of expert 
evidence was observed.”84 
3.  Prior Survey and Case Study Research—Conclusion 
In assessing the results of prior research in the field, both survey instruments 
and case review studies remain largely inconclusive on the effect of the 
Daubert ruling.  Clearly, the Krafka survey responses and the Dixon and Gill 
case review study demonstrate support for the conclusion that Daubert has 
raised the standard for admission of expert testimony.  Conversely, Gatowski’s 
survey and the Groscup case review study demonstrate little to no difference 
between Frye and Daubert jurisdictions, suggesting the change is much ado 
about nothing. 
Without a clear finding from prior research, and without more guidance 
from the Supreme Court, the question of Daubert’s effect remained open.  To 
find out more, researchers Edward Cheng and Albert Yoon turned to a new 
tool of analysis. 
II.  REMOVAL RATE APPROACH TO ANALYZING DAUBERT 
To answer the question of whether Daubert adopted a stricter standard for 
admitting scientific evidence, Cheng and Yoon adopted a new approach by 
analyzing a new metric and a large amount of case data to measure Daubert’s 
effect.85  Their study concluded that the adoption of the Daubert standard did 
not have a statistically significant effect.86 
We found this conclusion counterintuitive and sought to re-examine the data 
Cheng and Yoon used, in order to try to explain their result.  Surprisingly, our 
analysis, using the exact same datasets as Cheng and Yoon, returned the 
opposite result.  We found that the adoption of Daubert did have a statistically 
significant effect when measured by the removal rate metric.87 
A.  The Cheng and Yoon Study: Basic Method and Result 
In their 2005 study, Cheng and Yoon’s innovation was to analyze state and 
federal aggregate civil case data, by isolating and then measuring the effect of 
the shift from the Frye standard to the Daubert standard by calculating the rate 
at which litigants remove cases with diversity jurisdiction from state court to 
federal court.88  After calculating this removal rate across several jurisdictions, 
                                                            
 84. Id. at 363. 
 85. See infra Part II.A (describing the Cheng and Yoon research study). 
 86. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 503. 
 87. See infra Part II.C (reaching the opposite conclusion of Cheng and Yoon). 
 88. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 482.  If a case meets the requirements for removal, a 
defendant must file a notice of removal with the appropriate federal court within thirty days of 
being served with the complaint.  28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006). When a case is removed from state 
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the study could then compare removal rates in Frye jurisdictions with removal 
rates in Daubert jurisdictions.89 
Because rate of removal is not reported by any given jurisdiction, Cheng and 
Yoon needed to calculate it themselves.90  To do so, they divided the number 
of tort cases removed from a jurisdiction’s state court and subsequently filed in 





The numerator was calculated using data from the Federal Court Cases: 
Integrated Data Base (Federal Database) created by the Federal Judicial 
Center.92  The denominator was calculated using the State Court Statistics, 
1985–2001 Dataset, which collected data from various state court databases 
(State Databases).93 
The central premise allowing for this comparison is that federal courts must 
use the Federal Rules of Evidence and, therefore, the Daubert standard is the 
only standard used in federal trials, including cases that originated in states 
using the Frye standard.94  As a result, a litigant in a Frye state can remove a 
case from the state court to the federal court, which is required to apply the 
Daubert standard, thus gaining the advantage of the different test for 
admissibility.95  Of course, litigants will only choose to remove their case if it 
                                                                                                                                         
court to federal court, it should be filed in the federal district court where the initial action is 
pending.  Id. § 1446(a). 
 89. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 482–84. 
 90. See id. at 488.  Unfortunately, Cheng and Yoon’s method of aggregating the data to 
calculate the removal rate has a number of flaws and produced data that could only be reproduced 
in an ad hoc fashion or could not be reproduced at all, which we discuss infra in Part II.D. 
 91. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 487 & fig.4 (describing the method by which 
Cheng and Yoon calculated the removal rate). 
 92. Id. at 488 (describing the method by which Cheng and Yoon gathered their data). 
 93. Id. at 488, 492.  Cheng and Yoon engaged in two related studies: the Preliminary Study 
and the National Study.  The Preliminary Study utilized two state-specific databases: the New 
York data came from the Technology Division of the New York State Unified Court System 
database (New York Database), and the Connecticut data came from the Judicial information 
Systems division of the Connecticut Judicial Branch (Connecticut Database).  Id. at 488.  The 
National Study utilized a database created by the National Center for State Courts called State 
Court Statistics, 1985 to 2001 (State Database).  Id. at 492. 
 94. See id. at 482–83 (discussing how admissibility standards are procedural and, therefore, 
do not have to be followed in federal court under the well-established Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins standard). 
 95. See id. (noting that the admissibility standard plays a major role in a litigant’s decision 
to remove a case to federal court). 
Rate of removal =
# of tort cases removed to federal court 
# of tort cases filed in state court 
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is in their best interest.96  This innovative study design captured the effect of 
Daubert on a larger body of cases, not just those that went to trial or resulted in 
appellate decisions, as in previous studies.97  The new metric also avoided 
filtering the results through survey responses, allowing Cheng and Yoon to 
measure the real-world effect of the Daubert standard.98 
Cheng and Yoon compared the removal rate of 16 states—8 Daubert states 
and 8 Frye states—from 1994 to 2000.99  Using a fixed effects statistical 
model,100 the study found that “a state’s choice of scientific admissibility 
standard does not have a statistically significant effect on removal rates.”101  
Because there is no effect of the standard on removal rates, Cheng and Yoon 
concluded that “a state’s adoption of Frye or Daubert makes no difference in 
practice”102 and that the power of Daubert lies solely in a judge’s scrutiny of 
expert evidence.103 
B.  The Promise of Removal Rate Analysis 
We believe that the removal rate metric is the most important innovation of 
the Cheng and Yoon study and that it offers significant benefits over 
alternative methods, such as survey work or case studies.104  The power of the 
removal rate approach lies in the scope of cases included in the analysis.  
Under the removal rate approach, we can capture Daubert’s effect on a larger 
body of cases, not just those that went to trial or resulted in appellate 
decisions.105  In our analysis infra, we could include an aggregate total of 
3,997,970 cases.106  Case study research could never hope to individually 
                                                            
 96. See id. at 508 (arguing that the study’s validity depends on defense counsel’s capacity to 
make decisions that are in their client’s best interest). 
 97. See id. at 484 (noting that the removal metric captures more cases because it considers 
an earlier stage of the litigation process, eliminating the role that confounding variables, such as 
selection bias and sealed settlements, play in the process). 
 98. Id. (arguing that the removal rate reduces the problem of inaccurate recall often 
encountered by survey research). 
 99. Id. at 492–94 (discussing the criteria for exclusion from the study, such as states that did 
not clearly adopt either Frye or Daubert or states with incomplete data). 
 100. For a detailed discussion of this procedure and the results, see infra Part II.D.2.a–d. 
 101. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 503. 
 102. Id. (emphasis added). 
 103. Id. at 503, 505 (suggesting that Daubert’s influence resulted in greater awareness of 
junk science). 
 104. Id. at 506 (“The removal rate metric offers an important, useful, and much-needed 
alternative.”); see also supra Part I.C (reviewing the inconclusive results achieved by alternative 
methods of evaluating Daubert’s effect). 
 105. See DIXON & GILL, supra note 4, at xiii (analyzing only 399 district court opinions); see 
also Groscup et al., supra note 3, at 344 (analyzing only 693 appellate opinions). 
 106. This total refers to the cases collected from the State Database for the period from 1990 
to 2000, which we analyzed in the National Study, infra Part II.D, the Flight-from-Frye analysis, 
infra Part II.C.2, and the Flight-to-State-Court analysis, infra Part II.C.3. 
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analyze such numbers, and we believe this larger sample improves the validity 
and reliability of our results. 
Additionally, the removal rate approach avoids the potential shortcomings of 
quantitative survey research.  Namely, the removal rate analysis measures the 
true test of litigants’ opinions—their actions when their self-interest is in 
play—rather than simply measuring survey responses.107 
Finally, as Cheng and Yoon noted in their work, the removal rate metric also 
removes one potential distorting factor from consideration.108  Because 
removal occurs early in the litigation process, the strength of the evidence in a 
specific case is likely unknown at the time of removal.109  As such, a litigant’s 
removal decision usually cannot be based on case-specific evidentiary 
concerns, but rather represents a general opinion of the relative merits of state 
or federal court approaches.110 
With these benefits, we are convinced that the removal rate metric offers the 
best opportunity to measure the true effect of the Daubert decision. 
C.  Our Analysis of Removal Rates Shows That a State’s Adoption of Daubert 
Does Effect the Rate of Removal 
Using a fixed-effects approach to removal-rate analysis, Cheng and Yoon 
concluded that a state’s adoption of Daubert or Frye does not affect removal 
rates in a statistically significant manner.111  Because this result was so 
counterintuitive, we set out to determine whether their conclusion could be 
confirmed.  Our own statistical analysis demonstrates that defendants respond 
to a state’s adoption of Daubert or Frye in precisely the way one would 
intuitively expect if defendants think that the Daubert standard is stricter than 
the Frye standard.112 
1.  Two Thought Experiments and the Expected Consequences of Daubert’s 
Adoption: Flight-from-Frye and Flight-to-State-Court 
To understand the true effect of Daubert on removal rates, we must focus on 
what removal rates were intended to measure—defense attorneys’ views as to 
the relative strictness of the Daubert and Frye standards—and ask what the 
world would be like if defense attorneys believe that Daubert is a stricter 
                                                            
 107. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 508 (assuming that attorneys remove cases to 
federal court when removal is in their client’s best interest). 
 108. Id. at 484. 
 109. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006) (requiring that the removal decision be made within 
thirty days of receipt of the complaint). 
 110. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 484 (arguing that litigants make the choice to remove to 
federal court when it is a more favorable forum, regardless of the relative strength of the 
underlying merits of the case). 
 111. Id. at 503; see also supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
 112. See infra Part II.C.1–4 (detailing our analysis, methodology, and conclusion). 
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standard.  In engaging in this process we used two thought experiments.  The 
first thought experiment, “Flight-from-Frye,” is based on two assumptions.  
First, if defense attorneys believe that Daubert is a stricter standard than Frye, 
then, in cases where the admissibility standard matters, they should remove the 
case from a Frye jurisdiction to a Daubert jurisdiction.113  Second, although 
there is a cost to remove a case from state court to federal court, it is not 
excessive.114 
If these assumptions are true, then we should expect to see the following: if 
state A is a Frye jurisdiction at time t1 through t10 and if the federal courts 
adopt Daubert at time t5, then the rate of removals from state court to federal 
court should increase after time t5, with a steep increase initially followed by 






                                                            
 113. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 508 (arguing that removal rate analysis “depends 
on defense counsel’s judgment” of the “practical ramifications” of the admissibility standard in 
his or her jurisdiction); see also Henry G. Miller, The Daubert Debacle, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., 
Mar./Apr. 2005, at 24, 28 (asserting that “[t]hose representing corporate defendants accused of 
manufacturing dangerous products will, of course, try to go to federal court and make as many 
Daubert motions as they can,” and that a defense attorney can subsequently win a case based on a 
Daubert motion alone); cf. David Paul Horowitz, “Will the Gatekeeper Let Daubert In?”, N.Y. 
ST. B.J., June 2006, at 18, 18 (observing that defense attorneys in New York not only prefer to 
apply Daubert but have also advocated for its adoption in New York, a Frye state). 
 114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006) (“The clerk of each district court shall require the 
parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original process, 
removal or otherwise, to pay a filing fee of $350.”). 
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Figure 1: The “Flight-from-Frye” Theoretical Effect in Years 1 to 10 
 
This trend follows naturally from our first assumption: that defense attorneys 
believe that the Daubert standard will keep out more evidence than the Frye 
standard.  Thus, when it matters, defense attorneys will remove a case to 
federal court more frequently after the federal courts adopt Daubert to take 
advantage of the stricter standard even if it costs something to do so.  
Moreover, the change will be an increase in the rate of removals. 
Let us now reverse this in the “Flight-to-State-Court” thought experiment.  
Under the Flight-to-State-Court experiment, the two basic assumptions of 
Flight-from-Frye remain the same.115  Now, assume that state A is a Frye 
jurisdiction at time t1 through t10, the federal courts adopted Daubert at time t5, 
but then state A adopts Daubert at time t11.  As noted in the  
Flight-from-Frye experiment, there should be an increase in the rate of 
removals occurring after time t5.
116  But, because state A adopts Daubert at 
time t11, there is no longer any evidentiary advantage to removing from state 
court to federal court because the state and federal courts now will apply the 
same expert admissibility standard.  Moreover, there is some disadvantage 
                                                            
 115. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text (articulating the Flight-from-Frye 
assumptions: (1) that defense attorneys will remove to federal court where they believe that the 
Daubert standard will be beneficial; and (2) that the cost of removal is manageable). 
 116. See supra FIGURE 1 and accompanying text (reporting the findings from the  
Flight-from-Frye experiment). 
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because, under our second assumption, there is a cost of removal.117  This 
implies that, given the rise in removal rates between time t5 and t10 caused by 
the federal courts’ adoption of Daubert when state A had not adopted Daubert, 
we should see a decrease in the rate of removals after time t11 because of the 
lost evidentiary benefit of removal plus the cost of removal.  Graphically, this 
should look something like: 
 
 
FIGURE 2: THE “FLIGHT-TO-STATE-COURT” THEORETICAL EFFECT 
IN YEARS 1 TO 15 
2.  Analysis of Removal Rate Data Demonstrates Litigants Act in the Same 
Way as the Flight-from-Frye Thought Experiment 
In the Flight-from-Frye experiment, we expect to see the rate of removals 
increase in states that do not change from Frye to Daubert during a period 
before and after the federal courts adopt Daubert.118  Our analysis clearly 
demonstrates this effect. 
Our first step is to attempt to confirm (or deny) the Flight-from-Frye thought 
experiment.  In doing so we are attempting to measure only the effect the 
federal courts’ adoption of Daubert has on removal rates.  To measure this 
impact, we identified 13 states that were Frye states both before and for some 
                                                            
 117. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (requiring a filing fee of $350 for removal to federal court). 
 118. See supra FIGURE 1 and accompanying text (reporting the findings from the  
Flight-from-Frye experiment). 
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period after the federal courts adopted Daubert.119  Using these states, we 
engaged in two identical analyses: one of pure federal data,120 and the other of 
mixed federal and state data.121 
In each analysis we began by reconstructing the base data.  First, we 
calculated the rate of removal for each year in each state.  Second, we used the 
rate of removal and the number of tort cases filed in the relevant court (federal 
or state) to create a dataset.  The dataset contained one data entry for each case 
filed, and each entry contained a field for the year, state, and whether the case 
was or was not removed.122  This process created two datasets: a pure federal 
                                                            
 119. We used the following Frye states: Alaska, see Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 134 
(Alaska 1986) (using the Frye test and noting that the Frye test was adopted by Pulakis v. State, 
476 P.2d 474, 478 (Alaska 1970), overruled by State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1999)); 
Arizona, see State v. Lehr, 38 P.3d 1172, 1178–79 (Ariz. 2002) (stating that “Arizona adheres to 
the Frye standard in ruling on the admissibility of novel scientific evidence”); Connecticut, see 
State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 746 (Conn. 1997) (reconsidering Connecticut’s test for admitting 
scientific evidence, which had previously been based on the Frye test); Florida, see Williamson v. 
State, 994 So. 2d 1000, 1009 (Fla. 2008) (asserting that the Frye standard should be used before 
admitting expert testimony); Indiana, see Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 
460–61 (Ind. 2001) (noting that Indiana courts previously relied on the Frye test); Kansas, see 
State v. Simmons, 254 P.3d 97, 101 (Kan. 2011) (asserting that opinions based on scientific 
methods or procedures must be scrutinized under the test articulated in Frye); Michigan, see 
Craig v. Oakwood Hosp., 684 N.W.2d 296, 305–06 (Mich. 2004) (noting that the testimony in 
question was subject to the Frye test); Minnesota, see State v. Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Minn. 
2002) (using the Frye test); Missouri, see State v. Taylor, 298 S.W.3d 482, 500 (Mo. 2009) 
(stating that the Frye test was used to determine admissibility of scientific evidence); New York, 
see Giordano v. Market Am., Inc., 941 N.E.2d 727, 733 (N.Y. 2010) (stating that New York 
courts follow the Frye test); North Carolina, see State v. Peoples, 319 S.E.2d 177, 187 (N.C. 
1984) (noting that Frye is the general rule for admittance of expert testimony); Tennessee, see 
McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 262–65 (Tenn. 1997) (noting Tennessee’s prior 
adherence to Frye); and Washington, see State v. Roberts, 14 P.3d 713, 740–41 (Wash. 2000) 
(applying Frye). 
 120. See generally infra Part II.D (discussing the databases featured both in our study and in 
Cheng and Yoon’s).  This approach is somewhat contrary to Cheng and Yoon’s, which focused 
solely on whether state adoption of Daubert makes a difference in state courts.  See Cheng  
& Yoon, supra note 6, at 496–97 (stating that “our study only investigates whether Frye and 
Daubert makes a difference in state courts”).  We believe examining pure federal data is 
advantageous because the total number of tort cases filed in federal courts is much smaller than in 
state courts; therefore, changes in the number of removed cases would have a larger effect on the 
removal rate. 
 121. We used the Federal Database to identify the number of tort cases removed from the 
identified states.  See generally infra Part II.D.1.c (explaining the method by which we calculated 
removals to federal courts).  Next, we used the State Database to identify the number of tort cases 
filed in each state.  See generally infra Part II.D.1.d (discussing the method by which we 
calculated the number of tort cases filed in state courts). 
 122. This differs from Cheng and Yoon, who utilized rates of removal as their base data.  See 
Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 487–88.  Thus, if we had a dataset with 5 years of data for 1 
state, where each year had 100 entries, with a 5% removal rate each year, we would have a 
dataset with 500 entries of which 25 were identified as removed (5 per year).  Cheng and Yoon 
would have 5 entries: 1 for each year, containing the rate of removal for that year. 
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dataset and a mixed federal and state dataset.  The pure federal dataset 
contained entries using the Federal Database to calculate the number of cases 
removed, the number of tort cases filed, and the removal rate. The mixed 
dataset contained entries using the State Database to calculate the number of 
tort cases filed, the Federal Database to calculate the number of cases removed, 
and both of those numbers to calculate the removal rate.123 
Starting with the pure federal dataset, we limited the data to include just 
those cases in the 13 states that were the appropriate kind of tort action from 
1990 to 2000.124  Next, we limited the dataset to include only those tort cases 
that had been removed from state court to federal court.125  We excluded data 
from the specific states during certain periods of time where that data was 
excluded by Cheng and Yoon.126 
It is important to note that we have assumed that state adoption of Daubert 
will result in a decrease in removal rates from the point in time when the state 
adopts Daubert—presuming the federal courts have already adopted 
Daubert.127  Therefore, to eliminate confusion that this counter-effect could 
have, we removed data associated with it by excluding data for each state 
starting from the year the state adopted Daubert.128  We also eliminated the 
year Daubert was adopted by the federal courts (1993) because the confusion 
of the transition year would likely disrupt the analysis.129 
                                                            
 123. This second dataset is the same one used by Cheng and Yoon.  See Cheng & Yoon, 
supra note 6, at 491–94 (noting that in the National Study, Cheng and Yoon used the same 
methodology for calculating removal rates as in the Preliminary Study). 
 124. See infra Part II.D.1.d.i (discussing in detail the method by which we chose the 
appropriate type of tort cases). 
 125. Because there are far fewer federal tort cases, the denominator (number of tort cases) is 
substantially smaller than the corresponding number of tort cases filed in state court. 
 126. Cheng and Yoon’s Appendix A does not include data for Florida in 1999 and 2000, 
New Mexico before 1994, and Oregon in 1990.  See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, app. at  
512–13. 
 127. See supra FIGURE 2 and accompanying text (explaining the Flight-to-State-Court 
experiment). 
 128. We excluded data for Alaska from 1999 onward, see State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394 
(Alaska 1999) (holding that Alaska no longer applies the Frye test); Connecticut from 1997 
onward see State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 746 (Conn. 1997) (adopting Daubert); Indiana from 
1995 onward, see Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498–99 (Ind. 1995) (assessing the 
admissibility of expert evidence based on the Indiana Rules of Evidence and the principles of 
Daubert); and Tennessee from 1997 onward, see McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 
257, 265 (Tenn. 1997) (adopting certain aspects of Daubert and allowing expert evidence only 
where it will “substantially assist the trier of fact” and does not “indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness”).  Because Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, 
and Washington did not adopt Daubert in the relevant period, we used data from the entire 
relevant period for those states. See supra note 119 (detailing the standards for the states in 
question). 
 129. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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Using this data, we performed a fixed-effects130 analysis using logistic 
regression.131  This provided statistically significant132 results showing that the 
probability that a case in federal court was removed from state court increased 
after Daubert was adopted.133 
 
Daubert Adopted 
in U.S. Court 
Probability of Removal 
No 0.259268 
Yes 0.327401 
FIGURE 3: FIXED-EFFECTS ANALYSIS ON REMOVAL RATE 
USING FEDERAL DATA ONLY 
Next, we reproduced this analysis using the mixed Federal and State 
Database.  This analysis also produced statistically significant results 
demonstrating that the adoption of Daubert increases the probability of 
removal to federal court.134 
 
Daubert Adopted 
in U.S. Court 
Probability of Removal 
No 0.004517 
Yes 0.005297 
FIGURE 4: FIXED-EFFECTS ANALYSIS ON REMOVAL RATE 
USING STATE AND FEDERAL DATA 
The difference between the probability of removal in Figure 3 and Figure 
4—the probability of removal in Figure 3 is approximately 61.8 times larger 
                                                            
 130. See infra Part II.D.2.a–d  (explaining in detail our fixed-effects model). 
 131. We used a logistic regression because this method is generally preferred when the 
independent variable is categorical/binary.  See, e.g., ALAN AGRESTI & CHRISTINE FRANKLIN, 
STATISTICS 610 (2007); DAMODAR N. GUJARATI & DAWN C. PORTER, ESSENTIALS OF 
ECONOMETRICS 387–89 (2010). 
 132. All measures of statistical significance discussed in this Article relate to the p-value of a 
statistical hypothesis.  We will consider a result to be statistically significant if its corresponding 
p-value is less than or equal to 0.05.  This means that there is no more than a 1 in 20 chance (5% 
chance) that our result is due to chance.  DAVID HENSHER, JOHN M. ROSE & WILLIAM H. 
GREENE, APPLIED CHOICE ANALYSIS: A PRIMER 46–47 (2005).  In addition, a p-value of ≤ 0.05 
is consistent with general practice.  See, e.g., id; SCOTT E. MAXWELL & HAROLD D. DELANY, 
DESIGNING EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYZING DATA: A MODEL COMPARISON PERSPECTIVE 47 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
 133. Using only federal data, the p-value was less than 0.0005.  The results of the logistic 
regression are fairly robust and supported by the results of a linear regression, which provided a 
regression coefficient of 0.0595772, with a p-value of less than 0.0005. 
 134. Using both federal and state data, the p-value was less than 0.0005.  Once again, the 
linear regression also supports the conclusion that the removal rate following the adoption of 
Daubert in federal courts is statistically significant.  Using linear regression in the fixed-effects 
analysis, we achieved a correlation coefficient of 0.0014486, with a p-value of less than 0.0005. 
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than the probability of removal in Figure 4—is likely due to the difference in 
the method by which we calculated the rate of removal using the pure Federal 
Database and the mixed Federal and State Database.  In both cases, we used 
the same removal rate formula (Equation 1), the same numerator (number of 
tort cases listed in the Federal Database as having been removed from state 
court), but different denominators (number of tort cases filed in state court 
versus number of tort cases filed in federal court in a given state).  In the pure 
federal dataset, the denominator is the number of tort cases filed in federal 
court in a given state.  In the mixed federal and state dataset, the denominator 
is the number of tort cases filed in a given state court.  On average, there is 
only 1 tort case filed in federal court for every 30 tort cases filed in the relevant 
state court.135  Given this 30:1 ratio of filings, we should expect to find a 
comparable difference in probability of removal, which we did.136  These 
results unequivocally demonstrate that in states using the Frye standard, the 
adoption of Daubert by the federal courts results in an increased rate of 
removals to the federal courts. 
3.  Analysis of Removal Rate Data Also Demonstrates Litigants Act in the 
Same Way as the Flight-to-State-Court Thought Experiment 
The Flight-to-State-Court thought experiment proposed that, if the state 
court was initially a Frye state, remained a Frye state for a period of time after 
the federal courts adopted Daubert, but eventually adopted Daubert, the rate of 
removals should decrease.137  Looking at actual case data, litigants’ actual 
behavior mirrored this result.138 
We used 5 states that adopted Daubert from 1994 to 2000139—a period after 
the federal courts adopted Daubert—and 8 states that did not adopt Daubert 
                                                            
 135. This ratio (30:1) was calculated using the 16 states used by Cheng & Yoon during the 
period from 1990 to 2000.  See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 493 fig.7 (listing the states used 
by Cheng and Yoon during their National Study). 
 136. Compare supra FIGURE 3 and accompanying text (reporting the probability of removal 
using only federal data), with supra FIGURE 4 and accompanying text (reporting the probability of 
removal using both federal and state data). 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 115–17. 
 138. See infra text accompanying notes 139–44; see also infra FIGURE 5. 
 139. The five states are Alaska, Connecticut, Indiana, North Carolina, and Tennessee.  See 
State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394–95 (Alaska 1999) (adopting Daubert and rejecting Frye as 
inconsistent with the Alaska Rules of Evidence); see also State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 746 
(Conn. 1997) (holding that Daubert should be the new standard for accepting expert scientific 
evidence in the state); Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind. 1995) (holding that, although 
the Daubert standard is not binding, it is helpful in applying the Indiana Rules of Evidence); State 
v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639 (N.C. 1995) (holding that the test of whether to admit expert 
evidence requires analyzing the test adopted by the Supreme Court in Daubert); McDaniel v. 
CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 262–65 (Tenn. 1997) (noting Tennessee’s prior adherence to 
Frye and holding that a partial acceptance of Daubert is appropriate).  We ignore Arizona, 
Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York and Washington because they did not 
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through 2000 as controls.140  Once again, we engaged in two sequences of 
analysis: one using pure federal data and the other using mixed federal and 
state data. 
Using the pure federal data, we performed a fixed-effects analysis using a 
logistic regression and produced a statistically significant result, at the p ≤ .05 
level, demonstrating that adoption of a Daubert standard by state courts after 





Probability of Removal 
No 0.303158 
Yes 0.25104 
FIGURE 5: FIXED-EFFECTS ANALYSIS ON REMOVAL RATE USING FEDERAL 
DATA ONLY 
Remarkably, the results in Figure 5 show that the rate of removal reverts to 
the levels of pre-federal adoption once the state also adopts Daubert.142  This is 
precisely what we expected to find under the Flight-to-State-Court thought 
experiment.  Such a result strongly supports the underlying thesis that defense 
                                                                                                                                         
adopt Daubert at any point during the duration of our study.  See infra note 140.  We also ignore 
Arkansas and Oregon because they adopted Daubert before the federal courts.  See Prater v. 
State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. 1991) (adopting a Daubert standard of admissibility); see also 
State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 759 (Or. 1984) (adopting a liberal test that allows the judge to be a 
gatekeeper when determining whether certain evidence should be admitted).  The tests adopted by 
both courts are similar to the test later adopted in Daubert.  See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512, 519 (Ark. 2000) (noting that Prater is “strikingly similar” to Daubert); see 
also Moore v. State, 915 S.W.2d 284, 294 (Ark. 1996) (comparing the approach adopted in 
Prater to the approach in Daubert); State v. O’Key, 899 P.2d 633, 680 (Or. 1995) (holding that 
Daubert is a further development of the process the court started in Brown).  Finally, we ignore 
New Mexico because it adopted Daubert in 1993—the same time as the federal courts.  See State 
v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203–04 (N.M. 1993) (rejected Frye and citing Daubert as the 
controlling standard of admissibility in New Mexico). 
 140. The eight states that reject Daubert and continue to rely on Frye are Arizona, Florida, 
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and Washington.  See, e.g., State v. Lehr, 
238 P.3d 1172, 1178–79 (Ariz. 2002); Williamson v. State, 994 So. 2d 1000, 1009 (Fla. 2008); 
State v. Simmons, 254 P.3d 97, 101 (Kan. 2011); Craig v. Oakwood Hosp., 684 N.W.2d 296, 
305–06 (Mich. 2004); State v. Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Minn. 2002); State v. Taylor, 298 
S.W.3d 482, 500 (Mo. 2009); Giordano v. Market Am., Inc., 941 N.E.2d 727, 733 (N.Y. 2010); 
State v. Roberts, 14 P.3d 713, 740–41 (Wash. 2000). 
 141. The p-value is 0.002.  A fixed-effects analysis with linear regression did not provide a 
statistically significant result. 
 142. See supra FIGURE 3 (showing a similar rate of removal if the state and federal courts 
both adopt Daubert (.025104) as when the state and federal courts both did not adopt Daubert 
(0.259268)). 
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attorneys believe Daubert is the stricter standard.143  Next, we reproduced this 
analysis using the combined federal and state dataset but found no statistically 
significant relationships.144 
4.  The Empirical Evidence of Actual Removal Rates Demonstrates Litigants 
Behavior After the Adoption of Daubert Mirrored Our Thought Experiments 
By analyzing the removals from 1990 to 2000, we can demonstrate that 
those litigants in the dataset acted in the manner predicted by the  
Flight-from-Frye and Flight-to-State-Court thought experiments.145  This result 
strongly supports the conclusion that litigants themselves believe that the 
Daubert standard is stricter than the Frye standard.146 
D.  Removal Rates Studies: Squaring the Circle 
We began our project with the counterintuitive results from Cheng and 
Yoon’s work—that Daubert had no real effect on litigants and was much ado 
about nothing.147  Having run our analysis, the opposite seems to be  
true—litigants perceive Daubert to be a stricter standard.148  Both of these 
results, using the same data, cannot be correct.  Therefore, it became necessary 
                                                            
 143. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 113, at 24, 28 (explaining that defense attorneys remove 
cases to federal court when planning to file Daubert motions because Daubert employs a higher 
evidentiary standard than Frye). 
 144. Our suspicion is that the failure to find an effect is due to three factors.  First, the 
number of torts filed in state court compared to the number of torts removed to federal courts is 
extremely small.  See supra FIGURE 4 (noting that the rate of removal for torts filed in state courts 
is less than 0.53%, likely whether or not Daubert is adopted in federal courts).  Second, the 
number of torts in which scientific evidence is involved is also very small.  In this context, any 
change in the number of removals is likely to be very small compared to the total number of torts 
filed.  Third, in this context, Indiana and North Carolina both adopted Daubert in 1995 and 
Alaska adopted Daubert in 1999.  See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394–95 (Alaska 1999); see 
also Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind. 1995); State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639 
(N.C. 1995).  This means that for Indiana and North Carolina there is only one year where the 
trend can begin to be established before it is expected to reverse.  Similarly, for Alaska there is 
only one year where the reversal would be measured.  In such a context, it would almost be a 
miracle to find the effect. 
 145. See supra Part II.C.1–3. 
 146. After all, defense attorneys should remove their client’s case to federal court when it is 
in their client’s best interest.  Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 508.  Therefore, the change in 
removal rates outlined in the previous sections supports the belief that Daubert is a stricter 
standard than Frye.  See Miller, supra note 113, at 24, 28. 
 147. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 503.  For example, Cheng and Yoon suggest that, 
because the change in standard had no effect, state courts should consider uniformly adopting 
Daubert as the admissibility standard.  Id.  In addition, they suggest that advocates for reform 
should focus not on doctrinal tests, but on efforts to improve judicial outcomes.  Id. at 504. 
 148. See supra note 112; supra Part II.C.1–4 and accompanying text (discussing how our 
study led to statistically significant results at the p ≤ .05 level, demonstrating that whether a state 
court adopts Daubert significantly affects the removal rate to federal court). 
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so as to unpack the analysis Cheng and Yoon performed to find an explanation 
for the varying results.  In so doing, we found three errors: (1) a miscalculation 
of removal rates;149 (2) a failure to account for the difference in effect between 
state adoption of Daubert before federal adoption and state adoption of 
Daubert after federal adoption;150 and (3) a utilization of a study population 
that was too small to identify the effect of state adoption of Daubert.151  
Combined, these three errors suggest that our results, rather than Cheng and 
Yoon’s, are correct; Daubert is the stricter standard. 
1.  Cheng & Yoon—Review of Data Aggregation 
Before running a data analysis, a researcher must collect the underlying data 
to ensure its validity.152  Looking at the underlying data aggregation for the 
Cheng and Yoon study, we found what appear to be several errors.153  If their 
data is fundamentally flawed, any conclusions drawn from it will be 
undermined. 
a.  The Preliminary and National Studies 
Cheng and Yoon’s removal rate analysis (the “Analysis”) occurred in two 
stages.  In the first stage (the “Preliminary Study”), Cheng and Yoon compared 
Connecticut’s rate of removal in tort cases from state to federal court with 
removal rates154 from New York state court to the Eastern District of New 
York (EDNY) during the period 1994 to 2000.155  The Preliminary Study relied 
on a statistical model called “difference-in-differences,”156 a special case of 
fixed effect analysis.157  After engaging in a difference-in-differences analysis, 
Cheng and Yoon concluded that the 1997 adoption of Daubert by Connecticut 
did not have a statistically significant effect upon removal rates.158 
                                                            
 149. See infra Part II.D.1.c.i. 
 150. See infra Part II.D.3. 
 151. See infra text accompanying notes 258–64, 269–70. 
 152. See, e.g., Responsible Conduct in Data Management, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., http://ori.dhhs.gov/education/products/n_illinois_u/datamanagement/dctopic.html (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 149–51. 
 154. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 485 (comparing the Eastern District of New York and 
the District of Connecticut). 
 155. The EDNY includes the counties of Kings (the Bronx), Nassau, Queens, Richmond 
(Staten Island), and Suffolk. See EDNY, http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 25, 
2013) (stating “[t]he district comprises the counties of Kings, Nassau, Queens, Richmond, and 
Suffolk and concurrently with the Southern District, the waters within the counties of Bronx and 
New York”). 
 156. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 485–86 n.43. 
 157. See infra Part II.D.2.c (describing the difference-in-differences approach). 
 158. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 489–90.  Cheng and Yoon fail to provide the result of 
the difference-in-differences analysis of the Preliminary Study and, instead, merely conclude that 
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In the second stage of the analysis (the “National Study”), Cheng and Yoon 
analyzed removal rates for 16 states159 from 1994 to 2000,160 utilizing a fixed 
effects statistical model.161  After multiple efforts at constructing a model, 
Cheng and Yoon concluded that “a state’s choice of scientific admissibility 
standard does not have a statistically significant effect on removal rates (or 
number of cases removed).  This finding may support the broader theory that a 
state’s adoption of Frye or Daubert makes no difference in practice.”162 
b.  The Target Data: Rate of Removal 
Because removal rate is not reported by any given jurisdiction, Cheng and 
Yoon calculated it themselves163 by dividing the number of tort cases removed 
from a jurisdiction’s state court and then filed in that jurisdiction’s federal 
court by the number of tort cases in that forum’s state court system:164 
 
EQUATION 1 
c.  Calculating the Preliminary Study’s Rate of Removal 
The Preliminary Study attempted to assess Daubert’s impact on removal 
rates by comparing removal rates of the state of Connecticut with the EDNY 
from 1994 to 2000.165  In Cheng and Yoon’s study, the removal rate was 
calculated in six steps: 
                                                                                                                                         
it produces statistically insignificant results.  See id. (stating that “the difference between 
Connecticut’s removal rates ( . . . relative to EDNY) in the pre-Daubert period . . . and the  
post-Daubert period . . . is not statistically significant”).  We correct this omission infra in Part 
III.D.2.b–c. 
 159. These 16 states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee 
and Washington.  Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 492–93 (listing the states included in the 
National Study). 
 160. Id. at 492.  Oddly, Cheng and Yoon label their study as “National Study, 1990–2000” 
even though the econometrics analysis is limited to the years 1994–2000.  Id.  They add the years 
1990 through 1993 for “observational” purposes only, and do not include them in their analysis.  
Id. 
 161. Id. at 495–96 (stating that the model used the difference-in-differences approach, a 
model that assumes the observed variables are non-random). 
 162. Id. at 496–503. 
 163. See, e.g., id. at 487. 
 164. See id. 
 165. Id. at 485.  Cheng and Yoon believed that such a comparison was appropriate for a 
number of reasons.  First, New York and Connecticut are geographically close, economically 
connected to New York City, and “demographically similar.”  See id. at 486.  This implies that 
removal rate (and any subsequent increase or decrease in removal rates) of both areas, all else 
being equal, should be similar.  Second, at the time, New York state courts were Frye 
jurisdictions while Connecticut state courts transitioned from Frye to Daubert in 1997.  See State 
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1.  Calculate the number of torts in Connecticut state court using the 
Connecticut database;166 
2.  Calculate the number of torts in New York state court for the 
geographic area coextensive with the EDNY using the New York 
database;167 
3.  Calculate the number of removals from the Connecticut state 
courts to federal court that were filed in the United States District 
Court for the District of Connecticut;168 
4.  Calculate the number of removals from the relevant New York 
state courts to the United States District Court for the EDNY;169 
5.  Use Equation 1 to calculate removal rate for New York;170 and 
6.  Use Equation 1 to calculate removal rate for Connecticut.171 


















                                                                                                                                         
v. Porter, 698 A.2d 737, 746 (Conn. 1997).  Consequently, Cheng and Yoon believed that, if there 
is a statistically significant change in the removal rates between the two states after 1997, that 
would be evidence that the choice of admissibility standard for scientific evidence affects removal 
rates.  Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 486. 
 166. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 485–86. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. at 487–88. 
 171. See id. 
 172. Id. at 489. 
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 Connecticut New York (limited to EDNY) 
Year  # of torts 
filed 






# of torts 
filed 






1994 16,172 56 0.35 42,120 207 0.49 
1995 18,417 64 0.35 46,199 237 0.51 
1996 20,165 48 0.24 47,711 333 0.70 
1997 20,295 49 0.24 47,235 263 0.56 
1998 20,054 63 0.31 46,808 288 0.62 
1999 18,845 52 0.28 45,838 310 0.68 
2000 18,201 56 0.31 43,964 362 0.82 
TABLE 1 
d.  Recreating Rate of Removal for the Preliminary Study 
i.  The First Problem: Calculating the Number of Removals to Federal 
Court 
The first step in our review of Cheng and Yoon’s work was to attempt to 
confirm the results of the Preliminary Study.  First, we recreated Table 1 using 
the same data as Cheng and Yoon.174  The Federal Database came with a set of 
codebooks that explained what fields were included in the data and what each 
meant.175  The first field of interest in the Federal Database is the “nature of 
 
 
                                                            
 173. Because the number of removed cases is generally much smaller than the number of 
filed cases, we will report rate of removal as a percentage removal rate.  Thus, a removal rate of 
0.35% corresponds to a removal rate of 0.0035. 
 174. See infra Part II.D.1.d.iii.  Cheng and Yoon graciously provided us with a copy of the 
data used in the study.  When we were unable to recreate Cheng and Yoon’s aggregation numbers 
from that data, the authors obtained a copy of the Federal Database directly from the Federal 
Judicial Center.  That database matched the one Cheng and Yoon provided. 
 175. Codebooks were provided for various periods of time.  See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 1970–2000 pt. 117 [hereinafter FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR. DATA BASE], available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies 
/08429/ascii (covering 2000); see also id. at pt. 116 (covering 1999); id. at pt. 115 (covering 
1998); id. at pt. 104 (covering 1997); id. at pt. 103 (covering 1996); id. at pt. 98 (covering 1995); 
id. at pt. 88 (covering 1994); id. at pt. 87 (covering 1993); id. at pt. 86 (covering 1992); id. at pt. 
74 (covering 1991); id. at pt. 73 (covering 1990); id. at pt. 65 (covering 1989); id. at pt. 64 
(covering 1988).  All codebooks are on file with the authors. 
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 suit” field.176  According to the codebooks, a case was a tort if it had a nature 
of suit value of one of the following:177 
 
240 TORTS TO LAND 
245 TORT PRODUCT LIABILITY 
310 AIRPLANE PERSONAL INJURY 
315 AIRPLANE PRODUCT LIABILITY 
320 ASSAULT, LIBEL, AND SLANDER 
330 FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY 
340 MARINE PERSONAL INJURY 
345 MARINE - PRODUCT LIABILITY 
350 MOTOR VEHICLE PERSONAL INJURY 
355 MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCT LIABILITY 
360 OTHER PERSONAL INJURY 
362 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
365 PERSONAL INJURY - PRODUCT LIABILITY 
368 ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY - PROD.LIAB. 
370 OTHER FRAUD 
371 TRUTH IN LENDING 
380 OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY DAMAGE 
385 PROPERTY DAMAGE - PRODUCT LIABILTY 
The second field of interest is the “district” field,178 which identifies the 
district court where the case was filed.179  The third field of interest is the 
“origin” field,180 which would be a “2” if the case had been removed from state 
court to federal district court.181 
These fields were used to restrict the dataset in the Federal Database to torts, 
removed from state court to federal court, for the District Court of Connecticut 




                                                            
 176. See id. at pt. 117, at 7. 
 177. See id. at pt. 117, at 8. 
 178. See, e.g., id. at pt. 117, at 5. 
 179. See, e.g., id.  The district field for District of Connecticut was “05” and the district field 
for New York cases filed in the EDNY was “07.”  Id. 
 180. See, e.g., id. at pt. 117, at 6. 
 181. Id. at pt. 117, at 6–7.  The origin field indicates how the case was filed in the district 
court and each code corresponds to a particular path the case may have followed to reach the 
district court.  See id. 
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court in the EDNY and District Court for Connecticut, producing results that 
differed significantly from those provided by Cheng and Yoon:182 
 
 Connecticut New York (limited to EDNY) 
Year  Cheng & 
Yoon 
removals 
Authors’ # of 
removals 
Difference  Cheng & 
Yoon 
removals
Authors’ # of 
removals 
Difference 
1994 56 73 -17 207 259 -52 
1995 64 260 -196 237 358 -121 
1996 48 71 -23 333 414 -81 
1997 49 68 -19 263 319 -56 
1998 63 87 -24 288 340 -52 
1999 52 74 -22 310 363 -53 
2000 56 73 -17 362 413 -51 
TABLE 2 
Because of the significant differences in results, we reviewed the data to 
identify where Cheng and Yoon may have reasonably further limited the data 
to arrive at their results.  Eventually, we determined it was the jurisdiction 
field, which states:183 
1 -US government plaintiff 
2 -US government defendant 
3 -federal question 
4 -diversity of citizenship 
5 -local question 
 
We determined that Cheng and Yoon must have limited jurisdiction to only 
diversity of citizenship184 because doing so eliminates many of the differences 







                                                            
 182. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 489 fig.5. 
 183. See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR. DATA BASE, supra note 175, at pt. 117, at 7. 
 184. Id.  Cheng and Yoon likely ignored the “1,” “2,” and “3” field values because such cases 
were likely to be removed for reasons other than scientific evidence admissibility standards.  We 
also assume the “local question” cases, field value of “5,” were automatically ignored because 
there were no cases that fit into category “5” in the relevant period. 
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 Connecticut New York (limited to EDNY) 









1994 56 60 -4 207 212 -5 
1995 64 67 -3 237 240 -3 
1996 48 49 -1 333 338 -5 
1997 49 53 -4 263 265 -2 
1998 63 68 -5 288 289 -1 
1999 52 56 -4 310 314 -4 
2000 56 58 -2 362 363 -1 
TABLE 3 
Although the differences in results were smaller after adjusting for the 
jurisdiction limitation, they still did not match.185  Through trial and error, we 
were able to (mostly) conform our results to Cheng and Yoon’s results by 
eliminating three categories of torts: products liability, torts to land, and 
assault, libel, and slander:186 
 
 Connecticut New York (limited to EDNY) 









1994 56 56 0 207 207 0 
1995 64 64 0 237 237 0 
1996 48 48 0 333 333 0 
1997 49 49 0 263 263 0 
1998 63 63 0 288 288 0 
1999 52 52 0 310 310 0 
2000 56 56 0 362 357 5 
TABLE 4 
Removing these three tort categories was an ad hoc measure, but it did 
produce results that conformed to almost all of Cheng and Yoon’s reported 
results.187  The only remaining difference was New York, in 2000, where we 
                                                            
 185. See supra TABLE 3 (showing a disparity in the results even after the jurisdictional 
limitation was adjusted). 
 186. The “nature of suit” field was restricted to values between 300 and 400, excluding cases 
with the following values: 240 (torts to land), 245 (tort product liability), and 320 (assault, libel, 
and slander).  See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR. DATA BASE, supra note 175, pt. 117, at 7–8. 
 187. See supra TABLE 4 (showing more comparable results than in TABLE 3). 
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found 5 fewer torts.188  That result would match but only if we reintroduced 
assault, libel, and slander torts for just New York in 2000.189 
Our attempt to recreate Cheng and Yoon’s removals count to federal court 
identified a substantial methodological flaw in their calculations.  We could 
only reproduce their results by adopting two different ad hoc approaches.190  
Moreover, removing product liability torts from the analysis is of grave 
concern in a study on the effect of a change in scientific evidence admissibility 
standards because product liability cases are the torts where scientific evidence 
is most likely to be present and contested.191  Further, there is no rational basis 
for removing assault, libel, and slander, or torts to land (or reintroducing 
assault, libel, and slander for just New York in 2000).192 
ii.  Calculating the Number of Torts in State Court 
Although Cheng and Yoon’s data aggregation from the Federal Database did 
not match our aggregation without ad hoc data manipulation, we were able to 
replicate Cheng and Yoon’s data aggregation of the Connecticut database and 
New York database to calculate the number of torts filed in each state.193 
                                                            
 188. See supra TABLE 4. 
 189. However, if we reintroduced assault, libel, and slander to match Cheng and Yoon’s 
results, the only data points that would match would be New York in 2000. 
 190. See supra notes 184, 186 and accompanying text (explaining that we limited the data by 
jurisdiction and removed three “nature of suit” categories to match over 92% of Cheng and 
Yoon’s results).  Cheng and Yoon do not provide any explanation for their data aggregation 
methods that would account for or explain these differences.  Rather they simply stated that “we 
extracted only tort cases filed in the EDNY and the District of Connecticut for the period of 1994 
to 2000” and that they report this data in raw form in their Figure 5.  Cheng & Yoon, supra note 
6, at 488–89 & fig.5 (“Figure 5 shows the raw numbers and the calculated removal rates for 
Connecticut and the EDNY.” (emphasis added)). 
 191. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 483–84 (discussing the importance of scientific 
evidence in products liability tort cases); see also Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance 
Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in 
Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 289–90 (2001) (explaining the contested 
nature of scientific evidence in toxic tort cases and how those cases led the fight for a reformed 
standard). 
 192. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 485–91 (failing to provide any explanation for their 
methods for aggregating data). 
 193. There were two minor differences.  First, in 1997, we counted 20,294 torts filed in 
Connecticut while Cheng and Yoon counted 20,295 torts filed in Connecticut.  See id. at 489 
fig.5; see also supra TABLE 1.  Second, in 1999, we counted 18,844 torts filed in Connecticut 
while Cheng and Yoon counted 18,845 torts filed in Connecticut.  See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 
6, at 489 fig.5; see also supra TABLE 1.  We presume that this is a reporting or typographical 
error. 
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iii.  Because of Errors in Their Process, It Is Not Possible to Recreate 
Cheng and Yoon’s Preliminary Study 
Although we were able to essentially recreate Cheng and Yoon’s calculation 
of the number of torts filed in Connecticut and New York, we could not match 
Cheng and Yoon’s calculation of the number of removals to federal district 
court.194  Consequently, we reject Cheng and Yoon’s calculation of the 
removal rate from 1994 to 2000 in Connecticut and the EDNY. 
e.  Recreating the Data for the National Study 
Cheng and Yoon’s National Study examined the removal rate in 16 states195 
from 1994 to 2000.196  Their calculation of those rates of removal for that 






















                                                            
 194. See supra Part II.D.1.d.i (discussing the difficulty in determining how Cheng and Yoon 
calculated the number of removals from state to federal court during the Preliminary Study). 
 195. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 492–93 (including Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington). 
 196. Id. at 491–92 (noting the econometrics analysis was from 1994 to 2000). 
 197. Id. at app. a at 512–13; see also infra TABLE 5. 
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 90  91  92 93 94 95 96 97 98  99  00 
Alaska 1.69 2.39 5.15 1.39 1.49 1.17 1.79 2.39 2.83 1.62 1.94 
Arizona 0.3 0.36 0.51 0.61 0.26 0.25 0.31 0.4 0.34 0.31 0.48 
Arkansas 1.27 1.12 1.35 1.42 1.28 0.57 1.45 1.35 1.87 2.09 1.75 
Connecticut 0.16 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.36 0.36 0.25 0.25 0.31 0.28 0.3 
Florida 0.58 0.73 0.61 0.54 0.43 0.31 0.46 0.76 0.58   
Indiana 0.86 0.86 1.45 1.13 0.51 0.55 0.91 1.17 0.85 1.13 1.01 
Kansas 0.52 0.76 1.34 0.89 0.65 0.43 0.66 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.86 
Michigan 0.63 0.79 0.9 0.64 0.49 0.49 0.71 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.98 
Minnesota 1.42 1.97 0.98 0.9 0.86 0.48 0.8 1.87 0.99 0.92 1.12 
Missouri 0.9 0.88 1.2 1.08 1.1 0.66 0.78 1.24 1.09 1.14 1.11 
New Mexico    0.35 0.93 0.37 0.81 1.03 1.01 0.99 1.15 
New York 0.46 0.56 0.55 0.61 0.71 0.57 0.83 0.8 0.8 0.85 1.01 
North 
Carolina 0.31 0.49 0.47 0.56 0.42 0.37 0.44 0.52 0.62 0.64 0.77 
Oregon  0.88 0.97 1.08 1.46 0.61 0.48 0.86 0.41 0.56 0.74 
Tennessee 0.97 0.84 1.15 1.24 1.25 0.76 1.03 1.39 1.28 1.36 1.67 
Washington 0.61 0.24 0.43 0.38 0.28 0.16 0.38 0.23 0.25 0.32 0.48 
TABLE 5 
As with the Preliminary Study, our first step was to attempt to recreate 
Cheng and Yoon’s removal rates.  Here, recreating the removal rates was more 
problematic because, unlike in the Preliminary Study, we could not find any 
method that would reproduce all of Cheng and Yoon’s removal rates as 
reported in the National Study.198 
To reproduce Cheng and Yoon’s National Study, we used the Federal 
Database to calculate the number of torts removed from state court that were 
filed in the appropriate federal court.  Initially, we limited the set of cases to 
torts, from 1990 to 2000, that were removed to federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction.  Then, we calculated the number of torts in each state using the 





                                                            
 198. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the ad hoc method we used to 
reproduce most of Cheng and Yoon’s removal rates in the Preliminary Study). 
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 90  91  92 93 94 95 96 97 98  99  00 
Alaska 1.37 1.92 3.65 1.10 1.85 1.41 1.51 2.39 3.02 1.62 2.05 
Arizona 0.32 0.38 0.55 0.65 0.34 0.41 0.36 0.42 0.37 0.31 0.48 
Arkansas 1.33 1.24 1.39 1.51 1.77 1.41 1.66 1.44 1.96 2.19 1.89 
Connecticut 0.18 0.23 0.33 0.24 0.38 0.37 0.26 0.27 0.34 0.30 0.31 
Florida 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.30 0.23   
Indiana 0.61 0.85 1.44 1.13 0.67 1.14 1.07 1.25 0.88 1.13 1.03 
Kansas 0.57 0.83 1.38 0.93 0.79 1.02 0.87 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.99 
Michigan 0.70 0.83 0.91 0.67 0.65 1.01 0.97 1.02 1.00 0.99 1.02 
Minnesota 1.65 2.07 1.06 0.98 1.11 1.08 1.00 1.91 1.01 0.97 1.19 
Missouri 1.05 0.92 1.24 1.18 1.40 1.26 1.06 1.30 1.13 1.17 1.14 
New Mexico    0.35 1.03 1.65 1.25 1.08 1.01 0.99 1.20 
New York 0.48 0.59 0.59 0.69 0.86 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.86 1.01 
North Carolina 0.35 0.67 0.51 0.63 0.60 0.75 0.72 0.56 0.68 0.67 0.80 
Oregon  0.67 0.73 0.87 1.22 1.06 1.14 0.72 0.42 0.60 0.71 
Tennessee 1.09 0.87 1.19 1.34 1.67 1.67 1.37 1.46 1.32 1.40 1.72 
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Once again, our results differed from Cheng and Yoon’s:199 
 
 90  91  92 93 94 95 96 97 98  99  00 
Alaska -0.32 -0.47 -1.50 -0.29 0.36 0.24 -0.28 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.11 
Arizona 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.00  0.00 
Arkansas 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.49 0.84 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.14 
Connecticut 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Florida -0.31 -0.45 -0.38 -0.34 -0.24 -0.11 -0.24 -0.46 -0.35   
Indiana -0.25 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.16 0.59 0.16 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.02 
Kansas 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.59 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.13 
Michigan 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.52 0.26 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Minnesota 0.23 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.25 0.60 0.20 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.07 
Missouri 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.30 0.60 0.28 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 
New Mexico    0.00 0.10 1.28 0.44 0.05 0.00  0.00 0.05 
New York 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.23 0.07 0.00  0.00 0.01 0.00 
North 
Carolina 
0.04 0.18 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.38 0.28 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 
Oregon  -0.21 -0.24 -0.21 -0.24 0.45 0.66 -0.14 0.01 0.04 -0.03 
Tennessee 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.42 0.91 0.34 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Washington 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
TABLE 7 
We were only able to find 15 data points (state-by-year) out of the 170 
total200 where our results align with Cheng and Yoon’s results—a 9% success 
rate.  Then, we attempted to locate a method for counting that enabled us to 




                                                            
 199. See infra TABLE 7.  TABLE 7 was compiled by subtracting the values Cheng and Yoon 
found from the values we found. 
 200. See supra TABLE 7.  TABLE 7 has a total of 176 entries (16 states by 11 years).  Of 
these, we leave 6 blank (Florida in 1999 and 2000; New Mexico in 1990, 1991, and 1992; Oregon 
in 1990) because Cheng and Yoon also left those dates blank.  Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, app. 
a, at 512–13; see also supra TABLE 7.  Cheng and Yoon did not explain why those entries were 
left blank.  Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 491–513 (failing to account for blank entries).  
Although they did indicate that the databases used to calculate these results may have been either 
inaccurate or incomplete.  Id. at 492. 
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 rate.  Using the same ad hoc measures used in the Preliminary Study,201 we 
were able to produce results that were closer to Cheng and Yoon’s: 
 
 90  91  92 93 94 95 96 97 98  99  00 
Alaska -0.40 -0.70 -1.65 -0.36 0.22 0.24 -0.28 0.00 0.09 0.00  0.00 
Arizona 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.00  0.00 -0.01 
Arkansas 0.04 0.00  0.00 0.03 0.48 0.80 0.15 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.05 
Connecticut  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Florida -0.32 -0.46 -0.39 -0.34 -0.26 -0.11 -0.25 -0.47 -0.36   
Indiana -0.29 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.11 0.58 0.13 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Kansas 0.03 0.00  0.00 0.02 0.10 0.49 0.14 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Michigan 0.05 0.00  0.00 0.02 0.14 0.49 0.25 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Minnesota 0.19 0.00  0.00 0.06 0.22 0.50 0.16 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Missouri 0.13 0.00  0.00 0.05 0.24 0.56 0.25 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
New Mexico    0.00 0.02 1.22 0.39 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.03 
New York 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.22 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
North 
Carolina 0.02 0.00  0.00 0.04 0.18 0.36 0.26 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Oregon   -0.23 -0.25 -0.22 -0.25 0.39 0.61 -0.14 0.00  0.00 -0.09 
Tennessee 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.34 0.85 0.30 0.00 -0.01 0.00  0.00 
Washington 0.04 0.00  0.00 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.00  0.00 
TABLE 8 
Although this analysis does allow us to align 66 data points with Cheng and 
Yoon, that only comprises 39% of the entries.202  Ultimately, we were not able 
to find a method of calculating removal rates that produced results that 
matched Cheng and Yoon’s table of removal rates.  Thus, we can only 
conclude that a set of errors crept into their data calculation techniques. 
f.  Summary and Data Aggregation Conclusions 
In order to perform a useful statistical analysis, one must input data that is 
consistent and understandable.  Unfortunately, the data aggregation that Cheng 
and Yoon used to create the inputs to their statistical analysis is fundamentally 
flawed. Thus, any conclusions drawn from their data is suspect. 
                                                            
 201. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra TABLE 8. 
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2.  Recreating the Preliminary Study: A Statistically Significant Result 
Found Once the Proper Study Population Is Used 
As previously noted, Cheng and Yoon’s calculation of removal rates either 
miscalculates the rate of removal or utilizes an unknown, unidentified, and 
non-systematic method of calculation.203  Recreating the Preliminary Study 
using our own methods and our rates of removal allows us to conclude that 
there is a statistically significant effect from Connecticut’s adoption of 
Daubert in 1997.204  Cheng and Yoon’s failure to find a statistically significant 
result was likely due to the use of removal rates as the study population.  We 
find statistical significance by using properly calculated removal rates, counts 
of torts filed, and counts of torts removed to create a dataset in which there is 
one entry for each tort filed in the respective court and each data entry is 
identified as either removed or not based on the removal rate.205 
a.  An Intuitive Explanation of the Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
Cheng & Yoon attempt to analyze whether the rate of removal is correlated 
in a meaningful way with state adoption of Daubert by utilizing a  
difference-in-differences approach.206  A difference-in-differences analysis can 
be seen as combining two comparison techniques: before-after analysis and 
matching.207  In a before-after analysis, we measure the effect a treatment208 
has on a population by comparing the tested variable209 before and after the 
treatment is given,210 for example, comparing the removal rate in Connecticut 
before it adopts Daubert (pre-1997) with the removal rate after it adopts 
Daubert (post-1997).  Thus, the before-after analysis measures change over 
time within the same group, presuming that any change in the tested variable is 
due solely to the treatment.211  The problem with the before-after analysis is 
that there may be some unknown covariate within the population that alters the 
measured variable and thereby produces potentially incorrect results.212 
                                                            
 203. See supra Part II.D.1.e (discussing Cheng and Yoon’s errors). 
 204. See infra text accompanying notes 246–50. 
 205. See infra Part II.D.2.d. 
 206. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 485–86 n.43. 
 207. MYOUNG-JAE LEE, MICRO-ECONOMETRICS FOR POLICY, PROGRAM, AND TREATMENT 
EFFECTS 99 (2005) (describing the technique of difference-in-differences). 
 208. The “treatment” at issue is a state’s adoption of the Daubert standard. 
 209. The “tested variable” is rate of removal to federal court. 
 210. See LEE, supra note 207, at 64–65 (describing the before-after design). 
 211. See id. at 65. 
 212. See id. at 65, 99 (recognizing the danger posed by the “time effect” when using  
before-after analysis). 
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To avoid that problem, the difference-in-differences (DID) analysis 
combines before-after analysis with matching analysis.213  In matching, we 
compare two populations over the same period where one population receives 
the treatment and the other does not.214  Importantly, we must pick two 
populations that are comparable215 and are presumed to have the same 
covariate values.216  In the Preliminary Study, Cheng and Yoon carefully 
argued that Connecticut and the EDNY are comparable in this way.217 
By adding matching to before-after analysis, we can eliminate the effects of 
any unseen covariate in the treated population.218  In essence, if an unknown 
covariate is acting to decrease the rate of removals in the treated state 
(Connecticut), that same covariate should be acting in the same manner in the 
comparable state (New York). 
The process for performing a DID analysis is very simple.  First, calculate 
the mean rate of removal for Connecticut and the EDNY, separately, during 
the pre-treatment period (pre-1997) and the post-treatment period  
(post-1997).219  This provides four mean removal rates: (1) Connecticut  
pre-1997; (2) Connecticut post-1997; (3) EDNY pre-1997; and (4) EDNY 
post-1997.  Next, calculate the difference within each time period between the 
treatment group and the non-treatment group.220  Thus, we calculate the 
difference between Connecticut pre-1997 and New York pre-1997, and 
between Connecticut post-1997 and New York post-1997.  This results in the 
                                                            
 213. See id. (explaining how matching controls the undesirable effect that results from using 
a before-after design exclusively). 
 214. See id. at 79, 99 (stating how matching allows researchers to measure two tested 
variables, where only one of the tested variables receives the “treatment” at issue). 
 215. See James J. Heckman et al., Matching as an Econometric Estimator, 65 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 261, 261 (1998).  Two populations are “comparable” if both populations “would have 
experienced the same outcomes . . . had they participated in the programme.”  Id. at 262.  A 
central difficulty with matching is ensuring that the two groups are comparable.  See id. 
(explaining that it is difficult to determine whether two groups, having their “tested variable” 
measured, are truly comparable). 
 216. See LEE, supra note 207, at 99 (explaining that, if the effect of the treatment takes a long 
time to manifest itself, the changes observed between two control groups may be due to changes 
in other variables).  If both groups have similar covariate variables, it becomes more likely that  
the observed differences between the two groups are due to the treatment.  See id. 
 217. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 486–87 (explaining the choice of Connecticut and 
the EDNY). 
 218. See LEE, supra note 207, at 99. 
 219. The difference-in-differences method starts by selecting two tested variables with 
similar environmental conditions.  Id.  Once the tested variables are chosen, the researcher must 
compare the subjects’ response variables before and after one of the variables received the 
treatment.  Id. 
 220. See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS 
ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 227, 229–30 (2009) (discussing the requirements 
of a fixed-effects difference-in-differences analysis); see also LEE, supra note 207, at 99 (noting 
that the subjects’ response variables must be measured before and after treatment). 
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“differences” in difference-in-differences.  Finally, calculate the difference 
between the post-treatment period differences and the pre-treatment period 
differences.221  For instance, in this case, take the post-1997 result and subtract 
it from the pre-1997 result.  This results in the “difference” in the  
difference-in-differences. 
b.  A Mathematically Formal Description of the Difference-in-Differences 
Analysis 
Intuitively, the idea of the DID analysis is easy to grasp, but examining the 
method in a formal mathematical notation reveals the kind of phenomena the 
DID approach is meant to analyze.  To mathematically explain the DID 
analysis, we describe an algebraic method for doing a DID analysis that 
corresponds to the intuitive method.222  Then, we describe a method for doing 
the DID analysis using a fixed-effects analysis.223 
The algebraic explanation necessarily begins with the introduction of 
mathematical notation. 
Let:  
μi,t= the mean of the study variable
224 in state i at time t. 
i =  0 for the non-treatment group225 and i = 1 for the treatment group.226 
                                                            
 221. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 220, at 230 tbl. 5.2.3 (illustrating how to calculate 
the difference-in-differences using the average employment in fast-food chains as an example); 
see also LEE, supra note 207, at 100 (discussing how the difference-in-differences rate was 
calculated to measure the effect immigration has on unemployment). 
 222. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 220, at 228–29 (explaining an algebraic model of 
difference-in-differences analysis); see also David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and 
Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. 
ECON. REV. 772, 778–79 (1994) (applying the algebraic difference-in-differences method 
intuitively to study the effect of minimum wage changes on employment in the fast food 
industry); Daniel S. Hamermesh, Comment, What a Wonderful World This Would Be, 48 INDUS. 
& LAB. REL. REV. 835, 835 (1995) (specifying the algebraic formula for the  
difference-in-differences methods and critiquing the work of Card and Krueger). 
 223. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 220, at 233–41 (discussing  
difference-in-differences as fixed effects); see also MARNO VERBEEK, A GUIDE TO MODERN 
ECONOMETRICS 345 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that “[t]he fixed effects model is simply a linear 
regression model in which the intercept terms vary over the individual units i . . . .  We can write 
this in the usual regression framework by including a dummy variable for each unit i in the 
model”); Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences 
Estimates?, 119 Q. J. ECON. 249, 250–51 (2004) (discussing difference-in-differences estimation 
and the fixed-effects regression formula); Card & Krueger, supra note 222, at 779–81 (utilizing a 
least-squares dummy variable model to discuss the effect of minimum wage changes on 
employment). 
 224. In this case, the study variable is the average removal rate. 
 225. In this case, the non-treatment group is the EDNY. 
 226. The treatment group is Connecticut because it adopted Daubert in 1997.  See State v. 
Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 746 (Conn. 1997). 
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t =  0 for the pre-treatment period227 and t = 1 for the post-treatment 
period.228 
A DID analysis is performed by calculating the study variable mean for each 
population at specified time periods.229  In the Preliminary Study, the treatment 
group is Connecticut, the non-treatment group is the EDNY, the pre-treatment 
period is before 1997, and the post-treatment group is after 1997.  Excluding 
1997, the year Connecticut adopted Daubert, in terms of the variable μ would 
give us:230 
μ0,o = EDNY from 1994 to 1996  = 0.5771 
μ0,1 = EDNY from 1998 to 2000 = 0.7094 
μ1,o = Connecticut from 1994 to 1996 = 0.3259 
μ1,1 = Connecticut from 1998 to 2000 = 0.3183 
The difference-in-differences estimator is found by calculating the 
difference within each time period between the treatment group and the  
non-treatment group:231 
μ1,o – μ0,o = 0.3259 – 0.5771 = –0.2510 
μ1,1 – μ0,1 = 0.3183 – 0.7069 = –0.3910 
Finally, we calculate the difference between the post-treatment period 
differences and the pre-treatment period differences:232 
( μ1,1 – μ0,1) – (μ1,o – μ0,o) 
 =  –0.3910   –   –0.2510  
 =  –0.1400. 
This gives us a difference-in-differences estimator of – 0.14% (or -0.0014), 
which means that Connecticut’s adoption of Daubert decreased the removal 
rate by 0.14%. 
This number, standing alone, is not entirely helpful.  It is important to know 
if it captures a statistically significant correlation between removal rate and 
                                                            
 227. The pre-treatment period is pre-1997 because Connecticut adopted Daubert in 1997.  Id. 
 228. The post-treatment period is post-1997. 
 229. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (outlining the periods that our study needs to 
break the study variables into in order to perform a difference-in-differences analysis). 
 230. All values are shown in percentages.  We ignore the year of transition throughout the 
analyses because it is highly likely that the data will be confused, owing a part of the year to the 
Frye standard and a part to the Daubert standard.  Moreover, unless stated otherwise, the numbers 
used are based on our aggregation of the data, not Cheng and Yoon’s. 
 231. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
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adoption of Daubert.  This question is answered by recognizing that the DID 
approach is simply a special case of the fixed-effects method used by Cheng 
and Yoon in the National Study.233 
c.  Difference-in-Differences as Fixed-Effects Analysis 
Outside the context of a fixed-effects analysis, we would attempt, 
statistically, to capture the relationship between a state’s adoption of Daubert 
and removal rate by identifying a state where Daubert was adopted and then 
regressing the removal rate against years.  If there was an effect of adopting 
Daubert on removal rate, then, after the first year of adoption, the rate of 
removal would change in a (hopefully) statistically significant way.  Our 
discussion of the DID analysis should make us concerned that such a simple 
regression might fail because it does not take into account unknown covariates 
that could influence the removal rate in an unmeasured way and thereby 
interfere with finding a correlation between removal rate and the year.  This 
problem arises because the study populations are likely to be heterogeneous.234 
In this case, heterogeneity may be apparent at both the state and year level.  
In other words, despite the assumption of comparability between the EDNY 
and Connecticut, each state might have its own unique set of characteristics 
that affect the way Daubert is correlated with removal rate.  Similarly, each 
year might have its own unique characteristics that could affect the way 
Daubert is correlated with removal rates. 
One way to capture this heterogeneity is to create a regression formula that 
contains a set of dummy variables235 to capture the state-specific and  
year-specific heterogeneity:236 
 
Ratei,t = α1 + β1S1,i + β2 S 2,i + γ1Y1,t + γ2Y2,t + . . . + γ6Y6,t + δD1,t+μi,t 
EQUATION 2 
                                                            
 233. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 234. See Heckman et al., supra note 215, at 262 (explaining how difficult it is to tell whether 
two groups are homogeneous).  Ideally, if comparing data from two different subjects, we would 
prefer to assume that the statistical properties of the data for each subject are overall the same for 
the other subject.  When this occurs, we have homogeneity.  When this does not occur, we have 
heterogeneity; there may be unobserved relevant variables that are correlated with the observed 
variables and the value of those variables may differ from subject to subject.  See LEE, supra note 
207, at 64–65, 99 (discussing how changes that take place over time make it difficult to separate 
the “treatment effect from the ‘time effect’”).  A heterogeneous population has unique or 
individual characteristics as compared to another population.  See DAMODAR GUJARATI, 
ECONOMETRICS BY EXAMPLE 282 (2011). 
 235. Dummy variables are variables that have a value of 1 if a condition is met and a value of 
0 otherwise.  GUJARATI, supra note 234, at 47. 
 236. See id. at 283 (noting that equation 17.2 is the operation form of the “fixed effects 
regression model,” which accounts for heterogeneity). 
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Where the subscript i identifies the state (i = 1 when the state is 
Connecticut and 2 if the state is New York); 
the subscript t identifies the year (t = 1 for 1994, 2 for 1995, . . . 7 for 
2000);237 
Ratei,t is the removal rate at time t in state i; 
Sn,i is a set of two binary variables such that S1,i is set to 1 when i is 
1 (the state is Connecticut) and to 0 when i is 2 (the state is New 
York), and S2,i is set to 0 when i is 1 (the state is Connecticut) and to 
1 when i is 2 (the state is New York); 
Yn,t is a set of six binary variables each of which is set to 1 when n 
equals t;238 
Di,t is a binary variable that is set to 1 if state i at time t has adopted 
Daubert and 0 otherwise; 
α1 is the y intercept; 
βi is the regression coefficient for state i; 
γi is the regression coefficient for year i; 
δ is the regression coefficient for the Daubert variable and 
corresponds to the difference-in-differences estimator; and 
μi,t is the standard error term. 
At this point, any heterogeneity in the state or the year should be captured by 
the model.239  The equation can be solved through a regression analysis by 






                                                            
 237. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 489 (excluding 1997, the year of treatment). 
 238. Y1,t =1 when t = 1, which corresponds to 1994, and Y6,t = 1 when t = 6, which 
corresponds to 2000. 
 239. This depiction of the data may be somewhat misleading because, generally, we do not 
use all of the dummy variables in a fixed-effects analysis because of the “dummy variable trap.”  
See GUJARATI, supra note 234, at 283.  To calculate our Daubert estimator, we used a  
least-squares dummy variable model and performed a linear regression on that model.  Because 
there was one dummy variable for each state and one for each year, we encountered perfect 
collinearity between one state dummy variable and one year dummy variable and the rate of 
removal intercept.  See id. at 48, 283 (explaining how a perfect collinearity will lead to a common 
interval of 1).  To avoid this problem, we dropped one state dummy variable and one year dummy 
variable.  Id. 
 240. S1 is a dummy variable for Connecticut, S2 is a dummy variable for the EDNY, Y1 to 
Y3 are dummy variables for 1994 to 1996 respectively, Y4 to Y6 are dummy variables for 1998 
to 2000 respectively, and D is a dummy variable for state adoption of Daubert.  The year 1997 
was dropped because it was the transition year. 




Rate S1 S2 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 D 
0.0037 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0036 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0024 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0.0034 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
0.0030 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
0.0032 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0.0050 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0053 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0071 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0.0062 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0.0069 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0.0084 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
TABLE 9 
The linear regression,241 using Equation 2242 and this dataset, produces a 
value for the Daubert coefficient δ of –0.0013991, which is extremely close to 
the result calculated using the algebraic method (-0.001400).  Consistent with 
Cheng and Yoon’s conclusion,243 this result is statistically insignificant with a 
p-value of 0.329 and a 95% confidence interval of -0.0048985 and 0.0021003. 
At this point, given the lack of statistical significance, Cheng and Yoon 
concluded that there was no measurable effect.244  That conclusion is incorrect.  
Evidence of statistical insignificance does not mean the underlying effect is 
zero; rather, it means that the data and the analysis provide insufficient 
evidence to determine the effect.245  If, instead of using a pure rates dataset, we 
                                                            
 241. In this instance we used the same linear regression as Cheng and Yoon because it was 
consistent with our dual goals of explaining the statistical methods and demonstrating the 
problems with Cheng and Yoon’s methodology. 
 242. Importantly, the regression analysis will result in some of the dummy variables being 
omitted to avoid the problem of collinearity.  See GUJARATI, supra note 234, at 48, 283.  In this 
case, the dummy variables for Connecticut and 1994 were omitted. 
 243. Interestingly, Cheng and Yoon do not provide any of the results from their DID 
analysis—neither the value of the Daubert coefficient nor the p-value.  Instead, they merely 
conclude that the result is not statistically significant.  See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at  
489–90. 
 244. See id. 
 245. See SIU L. CHOW, STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: RATIONALE, VALIDITY AND UTILITY 8 
(1996) (noting that “an important real-life effect may be ignored simply because it does not reach 
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create a dataset that has one entry for each case filed in federal court, with each 
entry identified by state, year, and whether or not it was removed,246 we find a 
statistically significant correlation, at the p ≤ .05 level, between the adoption of 
Daubert and removal rate: δ = -0.0012657 with a p-value of 0.006.  This result 
is well within the 95% confidence interval calculated both in Cheng and 
Yoon’s linear regression on rates and in our own.  Thus, the fact that 
regression using rates proves to be statistically insignificant does not, by itself, 
prove that there was no effect.  Rather, it demonstrates a failure of the 
methodology to find the effect. 
d.  Using the Proper Study Population, the Preliminary Study 
Demonstrates That Connecticut’s Adoption of Daubert Decreased 
Removal Rates 
Using the proper removal rates, number of torts, number of removals, and an 
expanded dataset (the right study population), we were able to find that 
adoption of Daubert by Connecticut in 1997 decreased the removal rates in a 
statistically significant manner.247  Further, our result is compatible with the 
95% confidence interval provided by Cheng and Yoon.248  Thus, we can 
conclude that Cheng and Yoon were incorrect in their conclusion that Daubert 
cannot be shown to have an effect on removals.249  Instead, the opposite is 
true—Daubert does have an effect on removal rates and that effect is precisely 
what is expected if it is the stricter standard.250 
3.  Recreating the National Study: Statistical Insignificance Caused by 
Inclusion of Confounding Data and a Small Effect Hidden by the Kind of 
Study Population Used 
Having failed to find a statistically significant result in the Preliminary 
Study, Cheng and Yoon turned to the National Study where they used a fixed 
effects analysis on 16 states over 7 years to determine whether there was a 
statistically significant correlation between removal rate and state adoption of 
Daubert.251  Here, we will also be unable to find a statistically significant 
                                                                                                                                         
the arbitrarily chosen level of statistical significance”).  Adam Narkiewicz brought this point to 
our attention. 
 246. If, in New York in 1998, there is a removal rate of 5% and there were 1,000 torts, the 
dataset will have 1,000 data points, of which 50 will be identified as removed and 950 will be 
identified as not removed, but all of which will be identified as “New York” and “1998.” 
 247. See supra Part II.D.1.a–b; see also supra Part II.D.2. 
 248. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 498, 500–01 (measuring regression at the 95% 
confidence interval level). 
 249. Our data found a statistically significant correlation between adoption of Daubert and 
removal.  See supra Part II.D.2.d. 
 250. See supra Part II.D.2.d. 
 251. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 491–94. 
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effect.  But this failure is instructive because it unveils another error in Cheng 
and Yoon’s analysis: a failure to account for the fact that state adoption of 
Daubert before federal adoption differs in effect from state adoption of 
Daubert after federal adoption, leading to the inclusion of data from states that 
are not comparable.252  Once that error is eliminated, we find a statistically 
significant correlation between state adoption of Daubert and removal rate.253 
Similar to the fixed-effects version of the Preliminary Study, to engage in a 
fixed-effects analysis we must create two sets of dummy variables: one for the 
states and one for the years.254  Because we have 16 states, we will need 16 
dummy variables: 
S1,i is 1 when i = 1 (the state is Alaska) and 0 otherwise; 
S2,i is 1 when i = 2 (the state is Arkansas) and 0 otherwise; 
S3,i is 1 when i = 3 (the state is Arizona) and 0 otherwise; 
S4,i is 1 when i = 4 (the state is Connecticut) and 0 otherwise; 
S5,i is 1 when i = 5 (the state is Florida) and 0 otherwise; 
S6,i is 1 when i = 6 (the state is Indiana) and 0 otherwise; 
S7,i is 1 when i = 7 (the state is Kansas) and 0 otherwise; 
S8,i is 1 when i = 8 (the state is Michigan) and 0 otherwise; 
S9,i is 1 when i = 9 (the state is Minnesota) and 0 otherwise; 
S10,i is 1 when i = 10 (the state is Missouri) and 0 otherwise; 
S11,i is 1 when i = 11 (the state is New Mexico) and 0 otherwise; 
S12,i is 1 when i = 12 (the state is New York) and 0 otherwise; 
S13,i is 1 when i = 13 (the state is North Carolina) and 0 otherwise; 
S14,i is 1 when i = 14 (the state is Oregon) and 0 otherwise; 
S15,i is 1 when i = 15 (the state is Tennessee) and 0 otherwise; and 
S16,i is 1 when i = 16 (the state is Washington) and 0 otherwise. 
 
We will also need 7 year variables: 
 
Y1,t is 1 when t = 1 (the year is 1994) and 0 otherwise; 
Y2,t is 1 when t = 2 (the year is 1995) and 0 otherwise; 
Y3,t is 1 when t = 3 (the year is 1996) and 0 otherwise; 
Y4,t is 1 when t = 4 (the year is 1997) and 0 otherwise; 
                                                            
 252. Cheng and Yoon included two states, Oregon and Arkansas, that adopted a liberal 
standard for admitting expert testimony similar to Daubert years before Daubert was decided by 
the Supreme Court.  See id. at 493 fig.7. 
 253. See infra note 277 and accompanying text; see also infra FIGURES 6 & 7. 
 254. The inclusion of these dummy variables will help capture the heterogeneity between the 
study groups used in the data.  See supra Part II.D.2.d. 
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Y5,t is 1 when t = 5 (the year is 1998) and 0 otherwise; 
Y6,t is 1 when t = 6 (the year is 1999) and 0 otherwise; 
Y7,t is 1 when t = 7 (the year is 2000) and 0 otherwise; 
This produces the following formula: 
Ratei,t = α1 + β1S1,i + β2 S 2,i + . . . + β16 S 16,i + γ1Y1,t + γ2Y2,t + . . . + γ7Y7,t 
+ δDi,t + μi,t 
EQUATION 3 
Running a fixed-effects analysis with Equation 3, using rates as the 
dependent variable, and using linear regression, the Daubert coefficient δ has a 
value of -0.0008558 with a p-value of 0.871.255  Therefore, it is not statistically 
significant at the p ≤ .05 level.256  In addition, unlike the Preliminary Study, 
changing the dataset to a one-entry-per-case dataset does not lead to a 
statistically significant result. 
This result runs precisely counter to the result we achieve in the  
Flight-From-Frye thought experiment where we found a statistically 
significant result.  To explain this difference, we recognize two differences that 
prevent Cheng and Yoon from identifying the true effect of the states’ adoption 
of Daubert on removal rates.257 
The first difference is that of size.  We utilized a one-entry-per-case dataset 
and restricted the analysis to a pure Federal Database.258  Cheng and Yoon 
used removal rates based on the number of torts filed in state court.259  Thus, 
                                                            
 255. To avoid problems of collinearity, the regression eliminates one state dummy variable 
and one year dummy variable.  See GUJARATI, supra note 234, at 283.  In this case, the state 
dummy variable for Alaska and the year dummy variable for 1994 were eliminated. 
 256. Our result differs from Cheng and Yoon’s because their calculation of removal rates in 
their National Study cannot be reproduced in a systematic way.  See supra Part II.D.1.e.  Our 
result is based on a calculation of the removal rate by limiting the set of cases to torts, from 1990 
to 2000, that were removed to federal court, and under diversity jurisdiction.  According to Cheng 
and Yoon, δ has a rounded value of -0.0053 with a p–value of 0.951.  Cheng & Yoon, supra note 
6, at 497. 
 257. See infra notes 258–77 and accompanying text.  These errors are in addition to the 
difficulties created by Cheng and Yoon’s errors in calculating rates of removal.  See supra Part 
II.D.1.e. 
 258. Thus, we calculated removal rates as the number of cases removed to federal court 
divided by number of torts filed in federal court.  This removal rate was then used to create a 
dataset that had, for each state and year, as many entries as torts filed in the federal court of that 
state and year and where each entry was identified (in a ratio consistent with the removal rate) as 
either removed or not removed from state court. 
 259. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 491–92 (discussing how Cheng and Yoon gathered 
state court data regarding the number of torts filed in state court to calculate removal rates in their 
National Study). 
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our database is both larger and smaller than Cheng and Yoon’s.260  It is larger 
because we have 57,640 entries, while Cheng and Yoon have only 112 (a 
difference of 514.6-to-1).261  But, it is also smaller because Cheng and Yoon’s 
removal rates are calculated with a denominator based on tort filings in state 
court.  Thus, their removal rates summarize 2,956,439 cases while ours 
correspond to only 57,640 (a difference of 51.3-to-1).262  Both of these size 
differences work to our advantage and Cheng and Yoon’s disadvantage.263 
The large size of our federal dataset compared to Cheng and Yoon’s plays an 
important role.  Assuming the Daubert effect is small, it is more likely that a 
statistically significant result will be found in the larger dataset.264  Thus, our 
57,640 data entries enable us to more easily identify a statistically significant 
result.265  Similarly, Cheng and Yoon summarized a vastly larger dataset,266 
which will likely introduce many torts for which Daubert is not relevant.267  
Once again, if we assume that the Daubert effect is small, then it will be harder 
to find the effect if the data includes cases for which Daubert adoption is 
irrelevant because those cases will create a noise—masking the effect.268  
Thus, our 57,640 data entries work to our advantage. 
The second difference is the set of state Cheng and Yoon examined.  They 
analyzed 16 states269 while we look only at the 13 states that adopted Daubert 
after the federal courts.270  This difference matters because, if defense attorneys 
see Daubert as a stricter standard, then those attorneys will tend to stay in state 
court if they are in a state that adopted Daubert before the federal courts to 
                                                            
 260. See infra notes 261–62 and accompanying text. 
 261. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 497, 500–02 & fig.9 (showing that Cheng and 
Yoon had 110 entries after the 2 dummy variables were removed to avoid collinearity). 
 262. These numbers were calculated using Cheng and Yoon’s data and reviewing the number 
of cases filed per state and year.   
 263. See infra notes 264–69 and accompanying text (explaining our method used). 
 264. See CHOW, supra note 245, at 90–91 (discussing the sample-size dependence problem: 
whether or not statistical significance is obtained often depends on the sample size of the data). 
 265. Cf. id. (discussing how statistical significance is easier to find when there are larger 
numbers of entries tested). 
 266. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 491–93; see also supra note 262 and accompanying 
text. 
 267. Cf. Gross, supra note 11, at 1119 (noting that there are certain torts in which the rate of 
expert witness testimony is much higher). 
 268. This could be a covariate in the data because distinct states are likely to have a separate 
ratio of tort cases based on their location.  See LEE, supra note 207, at 64–65, 99 (discussing the 
problems covariates cause when comparing tested variables that take a long time to feel the 
effects stemming from a “treatment”). 
 269. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 493. 
 270. Arkansas and Oregon adopted tests similar to Daubert as a state evidentiary standard 
before the federal courts adopted Daubert in 1993, and New Mexico adopted the standard in the 
same year.  See State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 193, 203–04 (N.M. 1993); see also Prater v. State, 
820 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. 1991); State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 759 (Or. 1984); supra note 139. 
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gain the evidentiary advantage in state court.271  Once the federal courts adopt 
Daubert, there is a leveling of evidentiary standards.272  We would expect this 
to result in an increase in the rate of removals because defense attorneys would 
no longer use the evidentiary difference as a basis for staying in state court.273  
This is precisely what we find.274 
We engaged in two sets of logistic-fixed-effects analyses from 1990 to 
1996,275 one on pure federal data and the other using mixed federal and state 
data, using 10 states: Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Oregon, and Washington.  Arkansas and 
Oregon both adopted a Daubert standard before 1993 while the 8 other states 
did not adopt Daubert during the study period (and stand in as controls in our 
analysis).276 
Both sets of analyses yielded statistically significant results at the p ≤ .05 
level,277 demonstrating that the probability of removal increased after the 
federal courts adopted Daubert:  
 
Daubert Adopted By 
Federal Courts 









                                                            
 271. See Horowitz, supra note 113, at 18 (arguing that defense attorneys should remove the 
case when it is in their clients’ best interest); see also Miller, supra note 113, at 24, 28 (arguing 
that a defense attorney can win a case with a successful Daubert motion). 
 272. There is a leveling of standards because, in our hypothetical, both the state and federal 
courts apply the same evidentiary standard: Daubert. 
 273. See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
 274. See infra note 277 and accompanying text; see also supra FIGURES 6 & 7 (showing the 
results of the calculated removal rates). 
 275. We excluded 1993 because that is the year the federal courts adopted Daubert.  Daubert 
v. Merrell Down Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 276. See supra notes 140, 270 and accompanying text.  We eliminated New Mexico, which 
adopted Daubert in 1993, although it is unlikely that the adoption of Daubert by the federal 
courts would have any effect on removal rates in New Mexico because, before 1993, the federal 
and state courts used the same evidentiary standard, and, in this case, even after 1993, they both 
used the same standard.  See State v. Alberico, 861 P.3d 192, 203–04 (N.M. 1993).  Thus, its 
inclusion in the analysis would only create the same error found in Cheng and Yoon’s analysis. 
 277. The p-value for both logistic analyses was < 0.0005.  Both analyses also produced 
statistically significant results using linear regression showing that the correlation was positive 
between federal court adoption of Daubert and removal rate. 
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FIGURE 7: FIXED-EFFECTS ANALYSIS ON REMOVAL RATE USING FEDERAL AND 
STATE DATA 
Cheng and Yoon’s analysis uses one variable, the Daubert dummy variable, 
to account for two very different effects: (1) the effect of state adoption of 
Daubert where the state adopts after federal adoption and (2) the effect of state 
adoption where the state adopts Daubert before federal adoption.278  Because 
the two different effects work in opposite directions (increasing removal rate 
and decreasing removal rate, respectively), combining them is likely to result 
in one cancelling the other out and making it nearly impossible to find any 
statistically significant effect.279 
III.  DAUBERT IS THE STRICTER STANDARD FOR EXPERT WITNESS 
ADMISSIBILITY 
A.  Implications of the Daubert Effect Conclusions 
Our analysis demonstrates that the choice between Frye and Daubert does 
matter, and matters quite significantly.280  Courts addressing the substantive 
scientific admissibility standard must consider the effect of choosing between 
two different substantive standards.281  If a court chooses Daubert, the 
ramifications will be that litigants will perceive the standard as strictly 
assessing expert evidence.282 
The difference in scientific admissibility standards also has considerable 
effects on substantive tort law.283  Of course, the burden of proof in civil cases 
generally falls on the claimant, usually by a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.284  But, if the claimant must also prove issues that require expert 
                                                            
 278. See supra notes 269–76 and accompanying text. 
 279. See supra notes 132, 277 and accompanying text (discussing the statistically significant 
results found in our study). 
 280. See supra notes 133, 141, 277 and accompanying text. 
 281. Cf. Krafka et al., supra note 4, at 22–23 (explaining how judges’ actions in the  
post-Daubert era are indicative of the fact that the change in evidentiary standards has affected 
how they approach scientific evidence). 
 282. See id. at 22–24. 
 283. See infra notes 284–91 and accompanying text (expressing the significance of an expert 
testimony admissibility standard). 
 284. See Stein, supra note 14, at 81 (“For civil trials, the default proof standard is a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Under this standard, adjudicators must deem a factual allegation 
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testimony, the shift to Daubert will raise the requirements for the claimant to 
prove his or her case.285  Whether this shift is good or appropriate is not part of 
our analysis, except that any choice must be done knowing the full effect of the 
decision. 
Further, our study raises an issue that relates back to the origins of the 
Daubert standard itself.  In Daubert, Justice Blackmun, writing for the 
majority, rejected the Frye standard because it was so inconsistent with “the 
liberal thrust of the Federal Rules.”286  Despite this proclamation, we now see 
that the Daubert standard has tightened scrutiny beyond the Frye limits that 
troubled Blackmun and the majority.287  If so, the Court badly misjudged the 
effect Daubert would have on expert testimony, and the Court must now revisit 
the issue to clarify the standard, either affirming the new reality or reanimating 
the lenient standard originally intended.288 
Lastly, the results of this study also have an effect on litigants in court. The 
effect of stricter scrutiny will change the marketplace for expert services 
because only those experts that can provide a sound empirical basis for their 
opinions will be admitted.289  In a world of strict expert review, empirical 
testing will be the lynchpin of admissibility.290  Therefore, litigants encourage 
and support specific fields when they choose to hire fields that satisfy the 
criteria of empirical science, while other fields will be forced to adapt to the 
new reality or fade away.291 
B.  Potential Areas of Future Research 
There are several areas of further research that would build upon our 
analysis.  One method would be to apply the same approach to a different, but 
                                                                                                                                         
proven when it is more probable than not.” (footnote omitted) (citing Grogan v. Gartner, 498 U.S. 
279, 286 (1991))). 
 285. See supra Part II.D.2.d (explaining that Daubert is a stricter standard on litigants 
because it results in a higher rate of removals). 
 286. See supra text accompanying notes 47–56; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 
(1988)). 
 287. See supra Part II.E (concluding, instead, that Daubert has resulted in a stricter standard). 
 288. See Faigman et al., supra note 29, at 1810 & n.34 (describing the widely shared view 
that the Frye standard would prove to be a stricter standard for admissibility than Daubert as “an 
erroneous one”). 
 289. See Saks, supra note 10, at 239 (“Testimony from those fields that could, but do not, 
provide adequate data . . . should be excluded until they can provide adequate empirical support 
for what the experts are claiming for their field in general, or for themselves individually.”). 
 290. See id. at 238–39 (“For those fields that can answer essential questions about themselves 
with sufficient completeness . . . the decision whether to admit or exclude can be made with 
relative ease.”). 
 291. See id. at 240 (observing that Daubert created a difficult situation for sciences that 
cannot satisfy the empirical data criteria). 
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similar, set of data.  As mentioned previously, the success of the analysis 
necessarily depends on the underlying data quality.292  The analysis here relies, 
in whole or in part, on the federal dataset.293  The same analysis, utilizing 
exclusively state-level data, may be useful to confirm or rebut these findings. 
A second area of further research evolves from a limitation of this study.  In 
removal rate analyses, the choice for removal lies with the defendant.294  
Although the removal rate analysis is a powerful tool to measure these 
litigants’ behavior, it can only capture about half of civil case actors.295  The 
other half, the plaintiffs/claimants, must be studied using other metrics.296 Use 
of these alternative metrics would result in a more complete picture of 
Daubert’s effects. 
A third potential study builds on the innovation of aggregate case data in a 
more general sense.  The removal rate metric is capable of capturing a 
considerably larger number of cases than a case study approach.297  For 
example, this study used data on nearly 4 million cases, as compared to the 
several hundred used in other studies.298  Just as our study applies the removal 
rate metric to civil case data, expanding on case review studies such as Dixon 
and Gill, a researcher could apply an aggregate case data metric to criminal 
case data as well, expanding on the case review approach of the Groscup 
study.299  This type of study could measure the aggregate effect of Daubert on 
criminal cases and compare it to the effect on civil litigation.  Additionally, 
aggregate case data methodologies can thoughtfully be applied to other 
substantive areas beyond Daubert.300 
Finally, because Daubert is a more restrictive test, one might start to wonder 
if it has become synonymous with, or at least subsumed within the sphere of, 
                                                            
 292. See supra Part II.D.1 (arguing that working with data that is fundamentally flawed will 
lead to inaccurate conclusions). 
 293. See supra Part II.C.2 (relying on the federal dataset). 
 294. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing the process for removal to federal 
court). 
 295. See supra text accompanying note 294 (noting that it is the defendant’s choice to 
remove to federal court and, consequently, this rate will only capture the defendant’s actions). 
 296. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text (noting the limitations of this study). 
 297. See infra note 298 and accompanying text (providing an example of this difference 
because the cited removal rate data approach was able to capture approximately 4 million cases 
when the cited case study approach was only able to capture 399). 
 298. See DIXON & GILL, supra note 4, at xiii (analyzing 399 district court opinions); see also 
supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 299. Groscup et al., supra note 3, at 344 (analyzing 693 appellate opinions). 
 300. Cheng and Yoon cite one example of aggregate case data methodologies being applied 
to an area other than to Daubert.  For example, they credit a 2002 Federal Judicial Center study 
on class action lawsuits for the origin of removals as an aggregate measure of procedural change.  
See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 6, at 482 n.32 (citing BOB NIEMIC & TOM WILLGING, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., EFFECTS OF AMCHEM/ORTIZ ON THE FILING OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: 
REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 12–13 (2002)). 
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summary judgment. A very strict admissibility standard could have the same 
effect, in practice, as summary judgment by limiting the evidence available to 
claimants. Daubert may have not reached that level, but it is important to 
consider the interrelationship of the two issues. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Since 1993, the effect of Daubert on expert admissibility has been hotly 
contested.  In Daubert, the Supreme Court indicated strongly that this test 
would be more lenient for admissibility of expert evidence.  Yet the initial 
perception of the effect was not overwhelmingly consistent with that result, so 
researchers began to investigate whether and how the scientific admissibility 
standard had changed.  Some survey data indicated that judges saw Daubert as 
a stricter standard, while some did not. Some case review analysis found that 
Daubert was a stricter standard, while some did not. Despite utilizing several 
different empirical methodologies, the final determination of Daubert’s true 
effect remained inconclusive. 
Finally, in 2005, Edward Cheng and Albert Yoon offered a fresh approach, 
utilizing removal rates to measure actual litigant behavior based on Daubert.  
Their approach captured several advantages over other approaches by:  
(1) aggregating large amounts of case data; (2) measuring real-world behavior 
without reporting a bias; and (3) isolating the scientific admissibility standard 
variable. 
We also believe removal rate analysis is the best tool for assessing the 
aggregate effect of Daubert, so we recreated Cheng and Yoon’s underlying 
removal rate data to conduct additional studies.  The results of this analysis 
demonstrated that, based on actual behavior in millions of real cases, civil 
defendants believe the Daubert standard to be a stricter one.  Not only does the 
removal rate increase in the years after Daubert, as one would expect if the 
standard for admissibility is tighter, but we can also show that if the state 
adopts Daubert, and in so doing returns the state and federal court to the same 
admissibility standard, the removal rate then drops in response. Both of these 
effects support the conclusion that defendants perceive Daubert as an 
advantageous, stricter standard. 
Because the results discussed in this Article so clearly contrast with Cheng 
and Yoon’s study, we then revisited the analysis Cheng and Yoon performed, 
looking for an explanation for the different results.  When we did so, we found 
methodological problems with both the underlying data aggregation and the 
mathematical analysis of those data.  Consequently, these errors undermine the 
validity of their study and their conclusions cannot be supported.  When using 
our methods, the answer is clear: Daubert is the stricter standard of 
admissibility. 
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